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Abstract
This thesis explores whether and how criminal sentencing may provide an effective
platform to address and remedy some of the structural violence that contribute to Black mass
incarceration. Introducing race at sentencing represents an attempt to promote, at the back end of
the criminal process, a discussion that is generally obscured at earlier stages. In critically
assessing the merits of an explicit discussion about race, this thesis considers the “paradox of
visibility”: in some contexts, a focus on Blackness operates to disadvantage African Canadians
interfacing with the criminal justice system; while in other contexts, a refusal to focus on
Blackness can support the myth of colour blindness and racial neutrality in the criminal justice
system. Introducing race at the sentencing phase is a challenging, and perhaps even a
paradoxical, manoeuvre – but one that may also be logical, insofar as we are operating within the
cruel illogic of white supremacy.
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Chapter One: Introduction
The criminal justice system is instrumental in manufacturing ‘truths’ and ascribing
meaning to Black bodies.1Typically, Black bodies are bounded by notions of risk, violence, and
dangerousness, which are harnessed as justifications for the harsh and degrading treatment
imposed on Black Canadians2 by the criminal justice system.3Put another way, the criminal
justice system not only acts upon stereotypical notions about Black Canadians; it is also
instrumental in their creation. To the extent that Black Canadians are stereotyped as
“dangerous,” “violent,” and “criminal,” they are disproportionately likely to attract scrutiny and
harsh treatment from criminal justice actors like police, prosecutors, and judges.4A predictable
result is the overrepresentation of Black Canadians among criminally accused persons and
offenders.5That overrepresentation, in turn, serves to validate the unfavourable stereotypes about
Black Canadians that it helps to produce. In essence, then, the risk that is coded on Black bodies
becomes self-reinforcing through a negative feedback loop: as more Black people are criminally
Barrington Walker, Race on Trial: Black Defendants in Ontario’s Criminal Courts, 1858-1958 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2010) at 20.
2
The term African Canadian, and Black, while used interchangeably throughout this document, have different
historical values. There is no culture in colour, therefore the term Black does not reflect the deep, vibrant histories
and cultural capital of peoples of African descent.
3
A Collective Impact: Interim report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons
by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2018) at 8; Camisha Sibblis,
“Expulsion Programs as Colonizing Spaces of Exception” (2014) 21:1 Race, Gender & Class 64. Professor Sibblis
relies on Sherene Razack’s idea that risk is read on the Body and argues that “Dominant ideology about the black
body belies how behaviours are interpreted and used to gauge propensity for harmful behaviours and predict future
harm, particularly because black bodies are believed to be innately savage and violent”. See generally, Sherene
Razack, Casting out: the eviction of Muslims from western law and politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2008).
4
A Collective Impact, supra note 3; Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling (Toronto: Ontario
Human Rights Commission, 2003); Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice
System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995); David M. Tanovich, “The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in
Canada” (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); Akwasi Owusu-Bempah, “Race and policing in historical context:
Dehumanization and the policing of Black people in the 21st century” (2017) Theoretical Crimin. 21:1 23.
5
A Collective Impact, supra note 3; David M. Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of
Maintaining Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 655; R v Le 2019
SCC 34 at 90 – 97. [Hereinafter “Le”]
1
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punished, more Black people are regarded as deserving of criminal punishment, and vice versa.
Ample social science data shows the depth and magnitude of this vicious phenomenon.6
However, despite recognition of the overwhelming evidence of the role that anti-Black racism
plays in the criminal justice system, and widespread agreement on the need to redress it, Black
Canadians continue to receive unfair treatment at all stages of the criminal justice process. This
unfairness is especially acute during the sentencing phase.7
Criminal sentencing is a form of structural violence that is a salient feature of the
relationship between Black Canadians and the State.8Indeed, punishment and Black lives have
long existed in an antagonistic struggle. There is reason to suspect that this relationship found its
genesis in Black slavery and is currently sustained through the pernicious and racist myths,
stereotypes and attitudes that code Black bodies as dangerous. Some Canadian scholars assert
that there is a clear genealogy from Black slavery to the current invidious presuppositions that
underlie the value and corresponding treatment of Black bodies.9According to Afua Cooper,
“slavery was the context in which current race relations were created.” 10Slavery was justified, in
part, by the belief that Black people were inferior and dangerous, and hence correctly the subject
Toni Williams, “Sentencing Black Offenders in the Ontario Criminal Justice System”, in Julian V Roberts and
David P Cole, “Making sense of sentencing” (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 200; Akwasi Owusu-Bempah,
“Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Canada” in Sandra M. Bucerius and Michael Tonry, The Oxford handbook of
ethnicity, crime, and immigration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Julian V Roberts & Anthony N Doob,
“Race, Ethnicity, and Criminal Justice in Canada” (1997) 21 Crime & Justice: A Rev of Research 469.
7
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4 at chapter 8.
8
See generally Clayton Mosher, “The reaction to Black Violent Offenders in Ontario -1892-1961: A Test of the
Threat Hypothesis” (1999) 14:4 Sociological Forum 635; Shelley Trevethan and Christopher J. Rastin, “A Profile of
Visible Minority Offenders in the Federal Canadian Correctional System”(2004) Research Branch Correctional
Service of Canada <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/r144-eng.shtml#LinkTarget_24738>;Report of the
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4; Julia Sudbury, “Celling
black bodies: black women in the global prison industrial complex” (2002) 70 feminist review at 59-60; See also
Toni Williams, supra note 6; Anne-Marie Singh & Jane B. Sprott, “Race Matters: Public Views on Sentencing”
(2017) 59:3 Can J of Crimin and Crim Justice 285.
9
See generally Milan Hrabovsky, “The Concept of “BLACKNESS” in Theories of Race” (2013) 22:1 Asian and
African Studies 65; See also Samuel L. Hart, “Axiology--Theory of Values” (1971) 32:1 Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 29.
10
Afua Cooper, “Acts of resistance: Black men and women engage slavery in Upper Canada, 1793-1803” (2007)
99:1 Ontario History at 7.
6
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of formal control.11After slavery was abolished, this belief persisted, and the over-criminalization
of Black bodies became a conspicuous method of continuing to control and subjugate Black
people.12This phenomenon remains largely unaltered today.13Current statistics and studies on
race and criminal sentencing find similar disparities in sentencing outcomes for Black Canadians
as existed in the decades following abolition.14However, limited scholarly attention has been
devoted to the impact that anti-Black racism has on the perception of judges tasked with
sentencing Black bodies.15 There is, however, reason to conclude that some judges engage in
differential sentencing based on race.16
Criminological research data suggests that “race-based thinking impacts the public’s
perception of sentencing appropriateness.”17This research has found that the public generally
viewed Black offenders as being more dangerous than their similarly situated white counterparts
and consequently deserving of harsher and longer sentences.18Thus, the iconography of the
dangerous Black man and its supporting narratives (i.e. so-called biological and social
predisposition to criminality) remain significant considerations in the sentencing of Black bodies.
In short, the contemporary legacies of slavery include the sophisticated structural and systemic
violence levelled against Black bodies by the criminal justice system. Its persistence may
Ken Donovan, “Slavery and Freedom in Atlantic Canada’s African Diaspora: Introduction, (2014) XLIII: 1
Acadiensis at 109.
12
Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present (Black Point, NS:
Fernwood Publishing 2017); Clayton Mosher, supra note 8.
13
A Collective Impact, supra note 3.
14
Jamil Malakieh, “Adult and youth correctional statistics in Canada 2016/2017” (2018) Canadian Centre for
Justice Statistics, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54972eng.pdf?st=LI8Q630j>;Emerson Douyon, “Ethnocultural Minorities and the Canadian Correctional System”
(2016) Correctional Service Canada < https://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/about-us/006-4000-eng.shtml>; Shelley
Trevethan and Christopher J. Rastin, supra note 8; Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario
Criminal Justice System, supra note 4; Barrington Walker, supra note 1; Clayton Mosher, supra note 8.
15
Sharyn Roach Anleu, Russell Brewer & Kathy Mack, “Locating the Judge within Sentencing Research” (2017)
6:2 International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 46; Report of the Commission on Systemic
Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4 at Chapter 8.
16
Ibid.
17
Anne-Marie Singh & Jane B. Sprott, supra note 8.
18
Ibid.
11
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indicate an unrelenting institutional imperative to oppress and punish Black bodies. Indeed, antiBlack racism in the Canadian criminal justice system constitutes a longstanding, ongoing crisis
that must be addressed. In what follows, this thesis will focus on criminal sentencing as both a
fundamental cause and effect of this crisis and as a possible locus of reform.
Criminal sentencing is a platform on which pernicious notions of Blackness can either be
concretized or attenuated. Criminal sentences are not only communicated to the offender, but
also the wider community.19Depending on how they are constructed, they can either signal
judicial endorsement of egregious notions of Blackness, or official attempts at denouncing antiBlackness. This thesis takes as its starting point the understanding that criminal sentencing
functions as a form of structural violence that serves to reinforce anti-Black racism in Canada.20
Criminal sentencing is a central feature of the criminal process and involves a dynamic and
complex web of legal rules and procedures.21This thesis will investigate how the fundamental
principle of proportionality, enshrined in section 718.1 of the Criminal Code22, can be calibrated
to promote fairer sentences for Black offenders. Many scholars who study race and crime have
sought ways of reducing the over-incarceration of African Canadians by, inter alia, redressing
the known problem of disproportionate sentencing.23 However, sentencing reform is, at best, a
partial solution to the problem of the over-criminalization and disproportionate incarceration of
African Canadians and the broader problem of anti-Black racism.24

19

See generally R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Akwatu Khenti, “The Canadian war on drugs: Structural violence an unequal treatment of Black Canadians”
(2014) 25 International Journal of Drug Policy 190; David M. Tanovich, “Race, Sentencing and the "War on Drugs”
(2004) 22 C.R. (6th) 45; Toni Williams, supra note 6; Sonia N Lawrence & Toni Williams, “Swallowed Up: Drug
Couriers at the Borders of Canadian Sentencing” (2006) 56:4 UTLJ 285.
21
Steve Penney et al, Criminal Procedure in Canada, (Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2011) at Chapter 17.
22
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
23
Carmela Murdocca, To right historical wrongs: race, gender, and sentencing in Canada (UBC Press, 2013); Toni
Williams, supra note 6.
24
Kent Roach, "Making Progress on Understanding and Remedying Racial Profiling" (2004) 41:4 Alta L Rev at 903.
20
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It is generally accepted that one of the reasons for the over-incarceration of African
Canadians is the fact that Black offenders often receive disproportionately higher criminal
penalties compared to their similarly-situated white counterparts;

25

and as such, one goal of

progressive criminal justice reform should be the promotion and facilitation of proportionate
sentences for African Canadians. Despite this fact, almost no work has been done on the question
of how we might promote an anti-racist agenda through criminal sentencing. Not simply by
treating Blackness as something that is implicitly or unconsciously and unjustly, aggravating; but
by explicitly attending to it as a potential mitigating factor. 26In that vein, this thesis will
investigate an emerging strategy for promoting proportionate sentencing; namely, Cultural
Impact Assessment Reports (“CIARs”) or Impact of Race and Culture Reports (“IRCARs”) 27,
which are designed to emphasize specific cultural, social, and political mitigating factors that
ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian offenders.28One aim of this thesis,
therefore, is to assess whether CIARs/IRCARs can be salutatory in the context of our current
proportionality-based sentencing regime. It will, therefore, be necessary to take for granted that
the current Canadian sentencing regime, which is premised on the fundamental principle of
proportionality and retribution is desirable and can effectively redress the current disparities in
Black incarceration rates. In essence, sentencing innovation via IRCARs/CIARs will only find

25

Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4 at Chapter 8.
There were some scholarly discussions around Blackness, gender and sentencing in the wake of the R v Hamilton,
2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA) decision which will be discussed in detail below. However, for the most part these
articles did not attempt to work out how Blackness could be harnessed to achieve sentencing
proportionality.[Hereinafter “Hamilton”]
27
These reports are referred to as CIARs in Nova Scotia and IRCARs in Ontario.
28
Barbara A. Hudson, “Mitigation for socially deprived Offenders”. In: A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, ed.,
Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998) at 205-208; Michael
Plaxton, “Nagging Doubts About the Use of Race (and Racism) in Sentencing”, (2003) 8 C.R. (6th) 299; See
generally Dale E. Ives, “Inequality, Crime and Sentencing: Borde, Hamilton and the Relevance of Social
Disadvantage in Canadian Sentencing Law” (2004), 30 Queen's L.J. 114 – 155.
26
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success if they can properly interface with our current proportionality-based sentencing
framework.
Proportionality is the touchstone principle in Canadian sentencing law.29Penologists
assert that proportionality has two dimensions: cardinal and ordinal proportionality. 30Ordinal
proportionality suggests that similarly situated offenders should be treated alike and that if we
compare two offenders, the more blameworthy should attract a more substantial sentence. As
such, ordinal proportionality encompasses concepts of equality: if there are two comparably
blameworthy offenders (one white, one Black) and the Black offender receive a more substantial
sentence, then there is a failure of equality—and a failure of ordinal proportionality. To a large
extent, ordinal proportionality also assumes retributivism: it regards different levels of
blameworthiness as a legitimate basis (or perhaps the only legitimate basis) for assigning
different sentences. The link between proportionality and blameworthiness is made more evident
still by the concept of cardinal proportionality, which seeks an absolute correspondence between
wrongdoing and blameworthiness.31
A fundamental tenet of the retributive project is blameworthiness - specifically the proper
alignment of blame and desert.32From a retributivist perspective, an offender must be deserving
of his/her punishment.33Supporters of the theory assert that retribution is theoretically distinct
from vengeance.34In R v M. (C.A.), the Supreme Court of Canada (“the Court”), in holding that
retribution is a legitimate principle of Canadian sentencing law, explained that retribution:

R v Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13 at 37. [Hereinafter “Ipeelee”]
Andrew von Hirsch, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From "Why Punish?" to "How Much?”
(1990) 1:2 Criminal Law Forum at 282.
31
Ibid at 282-289.
32
Ibid at 262-263.
33
Andrew von Hirsch, ibid at 289-290; R v M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 SCR 500, 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC).
34
R v M. (C.A.), ibid at 80.
29
30
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is integrally woven into the existing principles of sentencing in Canadian law through the
fundamental requirement that a sentence imposed be "just and appropriate" under the
circumstances. Indeed, it is my profound belief that retribution represents an important
unifying principle of our penal law by offering an essential conceptual link between the
attribution of criminal liability and the imposition of criminal sanctions.35

Given the explicit endorsement of the Court, it is axiomatic that the modern institution of
criminal sentencing is grounded in retributivism. Retributivism in turn, however, rests on the
fundamental principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality, as it is conceptualized
and entrenched in Canadian sentencing law, functions as a restraint mechanism against grossly
severe punishments or those that are unjustifiably lenient or merciful.36Proportionality
supposedly aims at temperance and fairness.37For a punishment to be considered fair and just, it
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and moral blameworthiness of the offender.
An offender ought to be punished fairly - no more or less than he deserves. Fairness thus
becomes the sine qua non of criminal punishment, as any actual or perceived unfairness
threatens to throw the entire sentencing apparatus into disrepute.38It is within that vein that this
thesis aims to address the following question: is the impact of structural violence against Black
people a relevant factor for consideration in determining a fair and proportionate sentence?
This thesis will also discuss the paradox of visibility. In some contexts, a focus on
Blackness may operate to disadvantage African Canadians interfacing with the criminal justice
system, while in other contexts, a refusal to focus on Blackness may support the myth of colour
blindness and racial neutrality in the criminal justice system.39Therefore, introducing race at the
sentencing phase is a challenging, and perhaps even a paradoxical, manoeuvre – but one that
35

Ibid at 79 (not my emphasis).
R v M. (C.A.), ibid at 80; Richard G. Fox, “The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing” (1994) 19(3)
Melbourne U L Rev at 495.
37
Richard G. Fox, ibid at 492.
38
Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, 1985 CanLII 81 (SCC) at 129.
39
See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, (New York: NYU Press
2001).
36
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may also be logical, insofar as we are operating within the cruel illogic of white supremacy. The
erasure of race in sentencing jurisprudence may have arguably provided the catalyst for the
current CIAR/IRCAR movement.
Defence lawyers who introduce race and culture at the sentencing phase strive to
accomplish at the back-end of the criminal process a discussion that is generally obscured at
earlier stages.40It has only been in recent years that defence lawyers, starting in Nova Scotia,
have begun to meaningfully address the race and culture of their Black clients before sentencing
courts.41The trend has spread to Ontario, particularly in the Greater Toronto Area.42There has,
however, been no clear objective expressed by the Black community, or by defence lawyers,
with regards to the desired goal or impact to be achieved by the introduction and mobilization of
Blackness, through the expanded use of IRCARs/CIARs, before sentencing courts. For instance,
is the goal to edify sentencing judges about the pernicious nature of anti-Black racism in
Canadian society broadly, and more specifically, within the criminal justice system? Anti-Black
racism is a notorious fact that has gained a high degree of judicial consensus.43Even the most
conservative-minded jurist would be deemed unreasonable if he or she were to deny its
existence.
However, recognition of a notorious fact does not necessarily lead to the ameliorative
effect that is desired or expected to follow the facts’ recognition and acknowledgement.
However, while race talk may only marginally impact sentencing outcomes and redress the
broader issues of anti-Black racism, it is possible that when race-based evidence is introduced in

Kent Roach, supra note 24 at 903; David M. Tanovich, “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38
C.R. (6th) 84; Julie Jai & Joseph Cheng, “The Invisibility of Race in Section 15: Why Section 15 of the Charter Has
Not Done More to Promote Racial Equality” (2006) 5 J.L. & Equality 125.
41
R v “X”, 2014 NSPC 95.
42
R v Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527.[Hereinafter “Jackson”]
43
R v Parks, [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353; Le, supra note 5 at 89-97.
40
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sentencing, it repositions the centrality of race as a factor for judicial consideration which would
have otherwise been relegated to the periphery. CIARs/IRCARs ask judges to focus on the
colour of the accused’s skin so that they will focus on the content of the accused’s character. By
considering the lived realities of Black people, and that of the specific offender, sentencing
judges, may learn to disabuse themselves of pervasive Black stereotypes. There will undoubtedly
be some judicial resistance to this methodological shift given the general discomfort of judges to
engage in race talk. This resistance contributes to the frustration of litigating and existing in a
system that is now willing to recognize systemic racism but is still reluctant to recognize racism
in any one individual case. In some sense, the promise and pitfalls of CIARs/IRCARs parallel
the promise and pitfalls of criminal procedure cases that have created space for acknowledging
racism.44For example, in Le the Court may have potentially lifted the judicial embargo on racebased Charter45 litigation, particularly in Charter cases engaged by police encounters.46 Before
Le, the Court had only ever marginally engaged in a race-based analysis of the Charter rights
that were engaged by police conduct.47
However, while the shift in the Court’s detention analysis introduced by Le is laudable,
there is the risk that Le may not deliver on its promise. There is the real risk that defence lawyers
may inadvertently overemphasize race in every case concerning the detention of a racialized
person. For instance, defence lawyers should eschew a practice that seeks to generate a
rebuttable presumption that racialized individuals are immediately detained upon contact with
police. Despite overwhelming evidence of biased policing in racialized communities, such an

44

Danardo S. Jones, Lifting the Judicial Embargo on Race-Based Charter Litigation: A Comment on R. v. Le, (2019)
67(1&2) C.L.Q. 42.
45
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [“the Charter”].
46
Le, supra note 5; Supra note 44.
47
David M. Tanovich, supra note 40; Julie Jai & Joseph Cheng, supra note 40.
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uncoordinated and unprincipled mobilization of race may serve to diminish the precedential
potency of Le. Such an approach may also inadvertently and collectively generate a “boy who
cried wolf” type resistance to race-based s. 9 analyses.48A similar risk may exist regarding the
routine use of CIARs/IRCARS. Defence lawyers must be strategic in their deployment of race
during sentencing to avoid indictments for playing the so-called “race card.” However, if
deployed conscientiously but unapologetically, CIARs/IRCARS may have the potential to
achieve proportionate sentences for Black Canadians.
Another potential pitfall is whether CIARs/IRCARs are worth their cost, given the risks
of individual (re)traumatization and the unintended reinforcement of stereotypes. Therefore,
defence lawyers must use caution in deciding whether to have one generated. Moreover, to the
extent that defence lawyers are proposing sentencing reform centred on the use IRCARs/CIARs,
they must be prepared to acknowledge that these reports are not a “no-cost” or “low-cost”
proposition for the individuals and communities they seek to benefit. While IRCARs/CIARS are
potentially transformative documents, their production may be (re)traumatizing for the offenders
who are asked to reveal and revisit personal experiences with deprivation and trauma and may
pose the risk of reinforcing stereotypes.
IRCARs/CIARS can be criticized for attempting to create a lower standard of moral
blameworthiness premised simply on the mitigating quality of Blackness. Blackness,
consequently, may be inadvertently transformed into a monolithic reality that subsumes all Black
Canadians. This packaging of Blackness may serve to create an inaccurate and dangerously
misleading depiction of the varied and complex meanings ascribed to the Black experience.
While the introduction of these reports is a welcomed attempt at sentencing reform, defence

48

Le, supra note 5; Supra note 44.

10

lawyers must consider whether or how much focus should be placed on an offender’s Blackness.
In the cases reviewed for this thesis, it was found that defence lawyers, consciously or
unconsciously, placed a disproportionate amount of emphasis on the links between the offender’s
Blackness and his or her interactions with the criminal justice system and other structures of
violence (i.e. education, child welfare). This intense focus may inadvertently operate to reinforce
or reify certain pernicious notions about the inherent deviance of Black people. Therefore,
sentencing reform - and especially sentencing reform involving the use of IRCARs/CIARs - can
only be justified if its positive material impacts on communities and individuals outweigh its
costs.
CIARs/IRCARs may reinforce the idea that blameworthiness is a central measure for
punishment, and hence that retributivism is a legitimate sentencing theory. In this way,
CIARs/IRCARs seek to operate within our current sentencing paradigm. They do not participate
in the more radical structural critique that, for example, prison abolitionists suggest we should
bring to bear on the very institution of criminal justice.49Moreover, in the Canadian social and
political context, the institution of retributive and proportionality-based punishment cannot be
disentangled from racism and, therefore, cannot coexist with genuine racial equality.50As Paul
Butler, writing in the American context, remarked: “criminal law is racist because it is an
instrument of white supremacy.”51It may be, therefore, reasonable to take the position that any
effort at sentencing reform that preserves the fundamental principle of proportionality will

William Calathes, “Racial capitalism and punishment philosophy and practices: what really stands in the way of
prison abolition”, (2017) 20:4 Contemporary Justice Review.
50
Michelle Alexander, “The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in an Age of Colorblindness” (New York: The
New Press, 2001); Paul Butler, “Racially based jury nullification: black power in the criminal justice system” (1995)
105:3 Yale L.J. 677. I acknowledge that these sources are American, and, insofar as they are grounded in a
particular national history, they are not entirely transferrable to the Canadian context – however, the basic insight
they express is also compelling in the Canadian context.
51
Paul Butler, ibid.
49
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ultimately prove inimical to Black liberation and the eradication of systemic anti-Black racism.
However, CIARs/IRCARs may merit consideration as a “lesser evil option” that strives to work
within our current paradigm. In some sense, they seek to dismantle the master’s house with the
master’s tool.52
There are concerns, however, that a sentencing-focused response may not correctly
address nor redress the broader problem of institutional racism. Anti-Black racism cannot be
tackled on one front; instead, it requires an approach that considers the many layers of structural
violence that inform Black Canadians experience with the State. Indeed, the various institutions
of structural violence are intricately interwoven and feed each other. It is thereby imprudent to
attempt to apprehend any one of these institutions separately without acknowledging the
influence that they may exert on each other. For example, race scholars have discovered that
there is a causal link between the education system and criminal justice. They have dubbed this
phenomenon as the ‘school-to-prison pipeline.’53Some scholars have even analogized schools to
carceral spaces54 – a prelude to what will inevitably befall students that are the victims of
discriminatory and punitive education practices. Given the relationship between these various
institutions, it is crucial for scholars analyzing race, particularly Blackness, to eschew adopting a
myopic lens. It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to comprehensively analyze the
thorny intersecting relationships between these various structures of violence. Although criminal
sentencing is the primary focus of analysis, this thesis will, where necessary, draw on the
experiences of Black people in their interactions with other systems of violence.
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Section A: Roadmap
This thesis aims to explore how much consideration should be accorded to Blackness in
the sentencing of Black offenders. In that vein, if Blackness is accepted as a crucial contextual
factor for consideration, what impact should it have on sentence outcomes? Importantly, can
proportionality be achieved through the acknowledgment of anti-Blackness? The thesis will also
demonstrate how conflicting notions of Blackness may impact sentencing determinations. It will
argue that when Blackness is over-emphasized at sentencing, defence lawyers risk compounding
already entrenched notions of anti-Blackness in the criminal justice system. Indeed, an
unprincipled mobilization of Blackness may operate as an affront to the dignity of Black
Canadians. There is the reason, however, to hope that an increase in race talk at sentencing may
result in the reduction of Black over-incarceration. This approach raises an important question,
namely: whether criminal sentencing reform can be achieved through the extensive use of
IRCARs/CIARs. Put another way, does criminal sentencing provide an effective platform to
address and remedy anti-Black racism and other forms of structural violence that contribute to
Black mass incarceration?
This thesis will be divided into four (4) chapters. Chapter one (1) has provided a brief
overview of the thesis. Chapter two (2) will broadly discuss anti-Black racism in the criminal
justice system. It will specifically explore how over-policing and other racially biased policing
strategies inexorably leads to the over-imprisonment of Black Canadians. Chapter two (2) will
also provide a brief historical discussion of anti-Black racism in Canada. The discussion will
highlight the role that Canada played in the slave trade and its treatment of Black Canadians
post-slavery. Chapter three (3) will undertake a discussion of sentencing theory, both from a
philosophical standpoint and with a focus on the principles enshrined within our current
13

sentencing regime. It will also provide a case law review of sentencing decisions that have
considered race as a mitigating factor in the sentencing. Lastly, chapter four (4) will conduct a
critical analysis of the current IRCAR/CIAR movement. It will explore whether sentencing
reform can be achieved through the extensive use of IRCARs/CIARs. Moreover, it will offer a
prescriptive account of how our awareness of pervasive anti-Black racism ought to be
incorporated into our current sentencing regime. It will propose a sentencing framework that
promotes proportionate sentencing while attending to how individual responsibility and
sentencing fairness should be assessed in light of the cultural legacies and historical oppressions
of Black bodies/offenders.
Section B: Methodology
This thesis will utilize a mix-methodological approach by analyzing recent sentencing
cases from Nova Scotia and Ontario that considered the race and culture of Black offenders in
the formulation of a fit and proportionate sentence. Some of these cases utilized CIARs/IRCARs,
while others referred to the seminal cases on Blackness and sentencing, for example, R v X in
Nova Scotia and Jackson in Ontario.55These cases will be reviewed to provide a critical doctrinal
analysis of the reliance on CIARs/IRCARs within our current sentencing regime. This review
will be done through the lens of critical race theory (“CRT”) and against the backdrop of
penological theory. This thesis will also incorporate some of the critical scholarship on the policy
and scholarly debates about race and sentencing.

55

R v “X”, supra note 41; Jackson, supra note 42.

14

The thesis will draw on qualitative research data generated from semi-structured
interviews with defence lawyers and Black ex-offenders.56The former group consisted of both
male and female Black ex-offenders who are currently not entangled in the criminal justice
system. The ex-offenders ranged in age from early thirties to late forties.57They were mainly
Canadian citizens of Jamaican ancestry who were either under-employed or unemployed and did
not attend a post-secondary institution. These participants were largely recruited through
community contacts, and by word of mouth. I contacted friends and family members that I knew
had interactions with the criminal justice system, and sometimes, they provided me with other
potential participants.
Each participant was contacted by telephone to discuss availabilities and the scope of the
project and their involvement. All of the ex-offender participants were interviewed over the
telephone, mainly for convenience, but also because many were located in other cities. The
interviews ranged in duration from fifteen (15) minutes to over one and half (1.5) hours. I
recorded and digitally stored all the interviews. A prepared script was utilized. However, as the
interview unfolded necessary adjustments were made, for example utilizing probing questions
and permitting the participants to “go off script” when appropriate or would interfere with their
narrative if abruptly redirected. Nine (9) ex-offender participants were interviewed. Table one
provides details on these participants’ names, interview dates, age and gender and offence
categories.
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italicized those quotes that I have translated, and those that are direct quotes are marked by quotation marks.
57 One participant was 63 years old.
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Table 1
Name

Interview Date

Age, Gender

Offence(s)

1. S.L

April 2, 2019

30, Female

Drugs and firearm

2. A.W

April 2, 2019

48, Male

Drugs

3. J. M

April 2, 2019

39, Female

Assault

4. M.B

April 4, 2019

35, Male

Drugs

5. M.W

April 3, 2019

38, Male

Mischief

6. O.J

April 3, 2019

43, Male

Drugs

7. C.L

April 4, 2019

63, Male

Assault

8. S.R

April 5, 2019

32, Female

Firearm

9. E.B

April 15, 2019

34, Male

Robbery with Firearm

The second group comprised both male and female members of the criminal defence bar.
All of the defence lawyer participants are my colleagues and friends. I emailed each potential
participant and explained the scope of the project and their involvement. We would agree on a
time and date for the interview, which generally lasted between fifteen (15) minutes and thirty
(30) minutes. Most of the interviews were conducted in person, mainly because I worked in close
proximity to many of the participants. A few of the interviews were done by telephone. These
interviews were recorded and digitally stored. For the interviews conducted in person, I took
written notes. Table two below provides details on these participants’ names, interview dates,
gender and race.
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Table 2
Name

Interview date/Method

Gender/Race

1. H.D

April 17, 2019 – Telephone

Female/white

2. J.T

April 4, 2019 – Telephone

Female/white

3. D.F

March 28, 2019 – In person

Female/white

4. G.S

March 28, 2019 – In person

Female/Arab

5. S.H

July 30, 2019 – Telephone

Female/Black

6. L.L

March 27, 2019 – Telephone

Female/Black

7. T.L

March 29, 2019 – In person

Male/white

8. A.B

March 28, 2019 – In person

Female/white

9. G.C

March 28, 2019 – Telephone

Male/Black

As mentioned above, some of the interviews were conducted in person, but for
convenience, the majority were done over the telephone. The participants were asked similar
open-ended questions that aimed to explore the interplay between race, culture and social
deprivation/disadvantage and what weight, if any, from the participants’ perspective should be
accorded to these factors in the sentencing of Black bodies.58The study aimed to elicit
commentary on how race-based myths operate and are reproduced in the area of criminal justice,
particularly in the sentencing arena. The study’s findings, which will be discussed in greater
detail, revealed unexpected, albeit informative, results about the mobilization of Blackness in the
sentencing of Black offenders.
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The interview questions invited the participants to offer their thoughts, broadly, on the
criminal justice system and, more specifically, on how it impacts African-Canadians.
Admittedly, the questions were constructed to provoke an emotive response.59Race talk does
that. The questions were designed to create discomfort - not in the sense of traumatizing or
instilling fear in the participants - but by problematizing well-settled notions of racial
assignments and attributions.60The study aimed to elicit an honest and emotive response from the
participants that might encourage and contribute to an attitudinal and cultural shift in how we
understand Blackness and punishment. For example, consider this classic myth/stereotype:
Blacks are overrepresented in prisons because of their inherent desire to commit crimes. The
interviewees were asked to share their opinion on the so-called link between Blackness and
criminality - a link that many scholars consider to be the product of junk science and borne out
anti-Black racism. However, some of the ex-offender interviewees expressed that there may be a
link between race and crime. One female ex-offender remarked that all people engage in crime,
but Black people do more shootings and robberies, but they get more blame because of racism.61
Notwithstanding the size of the study62, the results provided an informative and rich
illustration of the diverging views that defence lawyers and Black offenders have about the
introduction of Blackness in sentencing. The participants offered invaluable insights about what
considerations should or ought to be accorded to Blackness in the sentencing arena. While the
study was too small in scope to generate useable statistical data, the responses it generates serve
I was granted ethics approval from the York University’s Office of research Ethics. Certificate #: STU 2019-022.
Approval Period: 03/26/19-03/26/20
60
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research: a risky business when it comes to collecting ‘sensitive’ data” (2012) 13:1 Qualitative Research 19;
Margaret Hunter, “Rethinking Epistemology, Methodology and Racism: Or, Is White Sociology Really Dead?”
(2002) 5: 2 Race and Society 119.
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to provide texture and specificity to the problem of Black over-incarceration and anti-Black bias
in criminal sentencing. Importantly, it may also provide some of the data that scholars currently
lack on whether or when it is appropriate to mobilize Blackness at the sentencing phase. This
data, particularly the findings from the ex-offender cohort, represents the voice of those people
who theoretically stand to benefit from the mobilization of race at sentencing. In analyzing the
data, I listened to the recordings and reviewed my notes. I chose quotes that believed were
germane to the topics that were under investigation, and that helped to provide context and
support for my assertions.
CRT provides the most appropriate theoretical perspective from which to analyze the
issues taken up in this thesis. It found its genesis in legal scholarship but has since spread to
other disciplines. The theory aims to provide insights on, and “transforming the relationship
among race, racism and power.”63CRT scholars (“Crits”) posit that racism is deeply entrenched
within society and is common and ordinary and therefore presents a significant challenge to
cure.64 Crits challenge the foundations of the liberal order that espouses notions of meritocracy.
They reject notions of colour-blind equality that seek to achieve formal equality. According to
Crits, society operates in a hierarchical fashion, which they term, white-over-colour ascendancy.
This hierarchy serves two functions, namely: psychic and material. 65This idea is referred to as
interest convergence or material determinism. Crits argue that “because racism advances the
interests of both white elites (materially) and working-class people (psychically), large segments
of society have little incentive to eradicate it.”66In a sense, racism serves to undergird white
supremacy and promote the interests of white people, notwithstanding their class.
63
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Another tenet of CRT is the social construction thesis, which holds that “race and races
are products of social thought and relations. Not objective, inherent, or fixed, they correspond to
no biological or genetic reality: rather, races are categories that society invents, manipulates, or
retires when convenient”.67Races are also subject to differential racialization. This process
occurs when “dominant society racializes different minority groups at different times in response
to shifting needs.”68Differential racialization is closely related to “the notion of intersectionality
and anti-essentialism. No person has a simple, easily stated, and unitary identity”.69An
intersectional approach considers the multiple sites of oppression that frame and informs the
Black experience. It considers that anti-Black racism may comprise a convergence of
vulnerabilities that cannot be apprehended singularly but must be understood at their intersecting
points. In this vein, it rejects essentialist notions of Blackness that seek to reduce or minimize the
Black experience as a universal, unitary phenomenon.
A unique feature of CRT is the voice of colour.70It rejects notions of neutrality in legal
scholarship and advocates for the inclusion of racialized voices in knowledge generation. The
voice of colour presupposes that Black scholars have inherent standing to discuss issues related
to Blackness on account of their lived experiences. Moreover,
the voice-of-colour thesis holds that because of their different histories and experiences
with oppression black, Indian, Asian, and Latino/a writers and thinkers may be able to
communicate to their white counterparts matters that the whites are unlikely to know.
Minority status, in other words, brings with it a presumed competence to speak about race
and racism. 71
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Frances et al. discuss the challenges faced by racialized and indigenous scholars in the
Academy.72An important issue that may not have been explicitly discussed, but deserves
consideration, is that specific knowledge is not being produced by those who have lived the
experience. The authors found in their study that racialized scholars are not given the same
opportunities as their white counterparts to engage/participate in this knowledge generation
economy.73Critical race scholarship may provide a platform from which racialized scholars can
disrupt the knowledge production enterprise.74
As a Black male researcher studying the impacts of anti-Black racial injustice in the
criminal justice system, it is critical to acknowledge my own social location, and some of the
experiences that animate and ground me. While I do not believe that an exhaustive exposition of
my positionalities, identities, and social location, and the role they played in the construction of
my research agenda, is warranted. I do, however, agree with critical race scholars that it is vital
for “Black and Brown writers to recount their own experiences with racism and the legal system
and to apply their own unique perspectives to assess law’s master narratives.”75However, the
researcher’s positionalities, identities, and social location, if not properly constrained,
acknowledged or accounted for may lead to data that reinforces the researcher’s presuppositions
about the topic under investigation. The study may also become vulnerable to criticism that it
was designed to produce a particular end. Thus, self-reflexivity may have its drawbacks when
“researchers who adopt a reflexive approach risk privileging excessive self-analysis and
deconstructions at the expense of focusing on the research participants and developing
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understanding.”76Despite this caution, self-reflexivity and an acknowledgement of one’s social
location and positionalities can facilitate the production of, what some scholars describe as
“transformative knowledge.”77
Like other CRT scholars, I “tell [my] stories of anti-Black racism as a way of healing and
performing [my] anti-oppressive practice that prompts action for social justice.”78This
methodological approach liberates the researcher from the shackles of positivism and
objectivity.79Indeed, feminist methodology encourages this emancipatory approach to knowledge
production by challenging the notion of universalism and the monopolization of the knowledge
production process.80The performance of the dispassionate researcher should be eschewed and
replaced by critical self-reflexivity.81Knowledge production, in this sense, becomes a symbiotic
enterprise which is critical in generating knowledge that may be used to combat racial injustice.
This approach may also shed light on taken for granted assumptions about the population or
issue under investigation.82It promotes the acknowledgment of power dynamics and ensures that
the participant’s agency is not undermined.83The extractive process, thus, becomes a joint and
equitable exercise - not an exploitative one. Researchers, however, must ensure that they “avoid
imposing meaning rather than constructing meaning through negotiation with research

Karen Lumsden, “‘You Are What You Research’: Researcher Partisanship and the Sociology of the ‘Underdog’ ”
(2012) 13:1 Qualitative Research at 4.
77
Joan M. Anderson, “Toward a Post-Colonial Feminist Methodology in Nursing Research: Exploring the
Convergence of Post-Colonial and Black Feminist Scholarship” (2002) 9 (3) Nurse Researcher at 12.
78
Martha Kuwee Kumsa, Magnus Mfoafo-M'Carthy, Funke Oba & Sadia Gaasim, “The Contours of Anti-Black
Racism: Engaging Anti-Oppression from Embodied Spaces” (2014) 1:1 The Journal of Critical Anti-Oppressive
Social Inquiry at 24.
79
Margaret Hunter, supra note 57 at 123.
80
Marjorie L. DeVault, “Talking Back to Sociology: Distinctive Contributions of Feminist Methodology” (1996)
22:1 Annual Review of Sociology 29; Joan M. Anderson, supra note 74.
81
Halleh Ghorashi, supra note 57.
82
Marjorie L. DeVault, supra note 77 at 33.
83
Ibid.
76

22

participants.”84It is within this spirit that I have chosen to introduce my own experiences with
criminal justice.
Section C: Personal Narrative (Between the Criminal Justice System and Me)
For most of my teenage and young adult life, I was entangled in the criminal justice
system. This reality, however, was a common experience for many of the young Black men in
the urban Toronto and Ottawa neighbourhoods, where I spent much of my teenage and young
adult life. The normalcy of this legal entanglement also extended to our parents, mainly our poor
single Black mothers. It was poor single Black mothers, in support of their young Black sons,
that filled the Eglin Street courthouse in Ottawa, 311 Jarvis youth court in Toronto, and various
other adult courthouses across the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). My mother was a frequent,
albeit reluctant and exasperated supporter of my older brother and me. She had to learn about the
obligations of a bail surety and other aspects of the criminal process. Many times, she and other
close family members would reluctantly have to disclose embarrassing personal and financial
information in order to secure our release. In essence, my entanglement in the criminal justice
system inadvertently exposed my family members to criminal justice. Thus, my criminal charge
and ultimate punishment became my mother’s charge and punishment.
When I was a young child living in my birth country of Jamaica, my mother and uncle told
me that one day, I would become a lawyer - mainly because of my loquacious personality. This
prediction was long before any of us knew what a lawyer was or did – except for what we would
have viewed on television. My first contact with a ‘real’ lawyer came with my first criminal
charge. This was my mother’s first contact with a ‘real’ lawyer, as well. For me, however,
contact with the criminal justice system meant street credibility. Over the years, I would be
Bev Gatenby & Maria Humphries, “Feminist Participatory Action Research: Methodological and ethical issues”
(2000) 23:1 Women’s Studies International Forum at 100.
84
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criminally charged several other times and would often retain different lawyers, but one thing
remained constant: most of them cared little about my circumstances. I was reminded of this by a
criminal defence lawyer that I had retained to act for me on one of my criminal cases. Due to the
obvious financial difficulties a person involved in the drug trade would experience following an
arrest and charge (heightened police surveillance, etc.), I was unable to pay him the amount we
had agreed on. I asked him for some time to pay, and he responded by telling me that “he didn't
care if I had to sell a pound of crack to pay his fee.” I never truly trusted any of my lawyers, but
there was an understanding that if I paid their fee, I might have a chance of staying out of jail.
However, lawyers were not the only questionable actors that I encountered in the criminal
justice system. The police dominated my fears. There was one simple understanding in the
streets: police officers hate Black people and vice-versa. That pretty much summed up race
relations from the perspective of an over-charged and racially profiled Black man. I never
questioned this reality; I just did my best to avoid the police, even in situations when I was doing
nothing illegal. I had learned the hard way that wearing black skin was illegal. I was arrested
and detained so many times, and for so many different reasons, often spurious, that I lost count.
Many of those arrests never amounted to a charge – just a reminder; it would seem that I was
being watched.
The above narrative, however, is not an indictment of all criminal lawyers or police
officers; instead, it is a description of what many Black men live with every day. I decided to
attend law school because I disliked the way lawyers and the police treated members of my
community and me. During law school, I was often implored by friends, colleagues and family
members to practice criminal law. They assumed that I would make an excellent criminal lawyer
because I was once dubbed a criminal. However, I queried if that was what the criminal justice
24

system required for reform: an influx of reformed Black criminals? Indeed, I have a unique
appreciation of the frustration that many young Black men are facing from an unfair criminal
justice system. Many of my friends and some of my family members are still caught up in this
system, and the police pump new blood, in the form of young Black men, into this system daily.
Thus, I would have enough work to keep me busy for a long time. My problem is that I am
sometimes morally conflicted about profiting from this onslaught. Call me naive, but I will not
directly or indirectly send a young Black man to sell a pound of crack to pay my fees.
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Chapter Two: Blackness and Criminal Justice
Section A: Anti-Blackness (A Brief Historical Review)
The institution of criminal sentencing and the broader criminal justice system is a form of
structural violence that continues to deprive Black people of their liberty and dignity. 85At these
sites, virulent stereotypes and attitudes about Blackness are reinforced and reified. There is,
however, a clear genealogy between these contemporary moments of racial injustice and Black
slavery.86The Black experience in Canada is a complex and often contradictory mosaic of
moments of extreme intolerance – for example, Black slavery87, institutional racism88, and
cultural and socio-economic disintegration – to periods where tolerance is official State
policy.89The latter, however, tends to form the basis of the contemporary national narrative,
which serves to minimize, or in some instances erase Canada’s history and current expressions of
virulent anti-Black racism.90For example, despite historical and archival evidence that documents
Canada’s involvement in the trans-Atlantic slave trade91, “the study of slavery is not a significant
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part of the Canadian historical narrative.”92The slave historiography has instead been skewed to
highlight Canada’s involvement in emancipatory undertakings such as the Underground Railroad
and Canada’s granting of asylum to fugitive Black Loyalists during the American Revolutionary
War and War of 1812.93
As Ken Donovan observes, “the study of slavery in Canada goes against the dominant
image of Canada as a land of freedom,” individual rights, multiculturalism and belonging. 94
Consequently, Canada’s slave history is supplanted and obscured by the recent introduction of
‘multiculturalism’ as official state policy.95However, while the institution of slavery operated on
a smaller scale in Canada, than it did in the other regions of the Black slave world, it nonetheless
existed and formed a significant part of Canadian history. 96Moreover, “slavery in the New
World, in addition to being an economic and labour arrangement, was also a racialized system.97
Indeed, the social dimensions of Black slavery were not only instrumental in manufacturing the
justifications for the practice’s introduction and longevity, but also its legacies. As historian Afua
Cooper aptly remarked, “slavery was the context in which current race relations were created.”98
Slave historian, Kenneth Morgan, also asserted that “the racial prejudice associated with Black
slavery has had an enduring impact on modern life.”99Slavery produced, reproduced and
reinforced a definitional frame that significantly contributed to the pernicious presuppositions
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underlying the value of Blackness and Black bodies.100It was also instrumental in assigning value
to Black bodies – both aesthetic and financial. Black bodies were deemed to be inferior,
heathenistic, subhuman, sexually promiscuous, unpleasant, violent, unintelligent, and
depraved.101 These labels were instrumental in constructing the justificatory basis for Black
enslavement.102 These moral, intellectual, physical and psychological deficiencies provided the
pretext

that

undergirded

the

institution

of

Black

enslavement

and

its

current

manifestations/legacies.103
Section B: Anti-Blackness (Post-Slavery)
Long gone are the days of slavery, but its contemporary legacies are equally as virulent
and destructive to the bodies of Black Canadians. Generations of Black bodies have experienced
the sting and indignities of the state’s whip - figuratively and literally.104The Black body is at
once a site of immense historical and contemporaneous State violence and trauma. This violence
is given expression through a variety of different, interrelated methods and institutions (i.e.
criminal justice, child welfare, policing, education, etc.).105The need to control and govern Black
bodies stretches back to slavery and has continued to the present day. 106The abolition of slavery
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in the British colonies, including Canada, was only the end of institutional chattel slavery, which
was replaced by even more invidious forms of white supremacy.107 The period between slavery
and the modern Black experience is marked by moments of extraordinary structural violence,
some that were legislated and others that persisted through the attitudes of white Canadians about
Blackness.108Constance Backhouse found in her study that the Ku Klux Klan, a white
supremacist group that was initially formed in the United States, took root in communities across
parts of southern Ontario and disseminated their hate-filled message about race-mixing - an
attitude that was shared in large part by many Canadians.109Studies also found that around that
time, anti-Blackness suffused the entire criminal justice system.110Over time, the methods of
control have included slave patrols111, weaponized rape112, anti-miscegenation policies113,
segregation114, intimidation115, restrictive immigration policies116, and other destructive and
insidious measures of denying Black peoples full citizenship and inclusion within Canadian
society.
Both Michelle Alexander, writing in the American context, and Robyn Maynard writing
in the Canadian context, agree that post-slavery, the over-criminalization of Black Canadians
became a conspicuous method of controlling Black bodies.117In terms of punishment, Mosher
argues that the institution of criminal sentencing was a method that was used following slavery

107

Constance Backhouse, supra note 85; Barrington Walker, supra note 1.
See generally Clayton Mosher, supra note 8.
109
Constance Backhouse, supra note 85 at 182; See also Clayton Mosher, supra note 8 at 643.
110
Barrington Walker, supra note 1; Clayton Mosher, ibid.
111
Robyn Maynard, supra note 12.
112
Ken Donovan, supra note 84.
113
Clayton Mosher, supra note 8 at 641-643.
114
Constance Backhouse, supra note 85 at 17 and 250-252.
115
Ibid at 187.
116
Clayton Mosher, supra note 8 at 641.
117
Michelle Alexander, supra note 50; Robyn Maynard, supra note 12.
108

29

to control the Black threat to white Canada.118For example, the study found that in Ontario
between 1892-1961, anti-Black stereotypes and attitudes were instrumental in sentencing
outcomes.119In fact, during that period, Black Canadians were disproportionately incarcerated
and subjected to harsher punishment compared to their white counterparts.120The disparity in
sentencing was mainly premised on prevailing notions of Black people’s propensity for
criminality and the need to control the purported threat that they posed to the social integrity of
Canada.121There is no recent evidence to suggest that current sentencing disparities are a reaction
to the same threat. However, and as will be discussed below in more detail, the association of
Blackness with criminality continues to increase the already disproportionate levels at which
African Canadians are arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned compared to their similarly situated
white counterparts.122
Section C: Anti-Black Racism, and Blackness (Some Definitional Musings)
Scholars assert that “the term anti-Black racism is intriguing. Its meaning is multi-layered
and configured differently, it could mean several things”.123Indeed, even Blackness, a concept
that is used extensively in this thesis, is “hotly contested.”124There is no monolithic notion of
Blackness, nor does there exist a prototypical Black person that embodies all the traits and
idiosyncrasies of all Black Canadians. There is an inherent danger in packaging Blackness as a
singular experience. It is, however, challenging to delineate the epistemological, axiological and
ontological contours of Blackness and anti-Black racism. The immediate goal of this thesis is not

118

Clayton Mosher, supra note 8.
Ibid.
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4; A Collective
Impact, supra note 3; Shelley Trevethan and Christopher J. Rastin, supra note 8.
123
Martha Kuwee Kumsa et al, supra note 75 at 21.
124
Ibid at 25.
119

30

to engage in a debate about semantics and definitions but rather to discuss the impacts of
structural violence that are a consequence of anti-Black racism. The practical realities of this
form of structural violence are hard to deny. As Stephen Lewis aptly stated in his report:
it is Blacks who are being shot, it is Black youth that is unemployed in excessive
numbers, it is Black students who are being inappropriately streamed in schools, it is
Black kids who are disproportionately dropping out, it is housing communities with large
concentrations of Black residents where the sense of vulnerability and disadvantage is
most acute, it is Black employees, professional and non-professional, on whom the doors
of upward equity slam shut. Just as the soothing balm of ‘multiculturalism’ cannot mask
racism, so racism cannot mask its primary target.125

For our purposes, anti-Black racism is best understood as a convergence of multiple sources of
oppression that finds its genesis in Black slavery. It is crucial to reject a unitary understanding of
Blackness. CRT scholars, most notably Kimberle Crenshaw, instead adopt an intersectional
framework that analyzes how multiple sources of oppression can “intersect” to create an axis of
vulnerability that is more than just the sum of its parts. Hence, it is not enough for us to
sequentially analyze each locus of oppression; rather, the intersection must be apprehended on its
own terms.126Thus, being a socially constructed concept, Blackness is experienced, understood,
created and manipulated in various ways.127Blackness is a multi-dimensional and complex idea
that is not easily understood. It exists and is given meaning at various intersections of social life.
Blackness in post-slave societies may be understood differently than Blackness in societies that
did not experience the trans-Atlantic slave trade. There is also an important distinction between
Blackness, as it is experienced in white-dominated societies, compared to how it is experienced
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in predominately Black societies. When asked if there is an inherent linkage between crime and
Blackness, one ex-offender remarked that there is nothing good about Black in the eyes of white
people.128In this sense, Blackness is understood as imposing a burden and not as a source of
pride, which is contrary to my own experiences of Blackness in my birth country of Jamaica.
Jamaica is a post-slavery country that is mainly populated by the descendants of Black
African slaves. In Jamaica, we were taught to be proud of our Blackness and enculturated to
appreciate the sacrifices and triumphs of our ancestors who resisted white subjugation. This
culture of resistance is the hallmark of ‘Jamaicanness’ and in turn, informs my understanding of
Blackness. My understanding of Blackness shifted when I immigrated to Canada. In Canada, I
was primarily introduced to topics that highlighted Black inferiority, both historically and
contemporaneously. I was taught that my descendants were slaves that lived in abject servitude
until finally being emancipated through the benevolence of white legislators. The misery did not
stop with the abolition of slavery. I was taught that post-slavery Black Canadians were denied all
the rights of full citizenship and relegated to the margins of society. Indeed, notions of Blackness
in Canada were in contradistinction to my experience of Blackness in Jamaica. William Oliver
describes this phenomenon as cultural racism. He argues that:
a significant example of cultural racism as a social and institutional practice and an
example of structural violence involves the conspicuous absence in most elementary and
high school social studies curricula of a substantive discussion of the contributions of
Africans and African Americans to the development of human civilization (BenJochannan, 1991). Given the importance of history and social studies as a means by
which a society introduces its young people to its celebration story, the conspicuous
absence of African Americans in history textbooks reinforces and promotes racist
ideology and racial stereotypes.129
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Indeed, anti-Black racism has ravaged Black communities in post-slavery countries where Black
people are a racial minority, like Canada. While the term Blackness is being used as a catch-all
for the commonalities that link the diverse experiences of Black Canadians - those
commonalities are informed by Canada’s legacy as a participant in slavery, which resulted in the
current sophisticated structural and systemic abuse in many areas of social life. Today, Black
Canadians experience exclusion, discrimination and oppression –largely in the form of antiBlack racism and its intersected realities violence, socio-economic status, personal beliefs, etc.
This reconstituted prejudice is brought into sharp relief in the administration of the criminal
justice system.
Section D: Anti-Black Racism and Criminal Justice
Anti-Black racism not only informs but is an accurate predictor of how Black Canadians
will interface with the criminal justice system. There is a clear genealogy from the most explicit
and violent forms of anti-Black racism to current expressions of structural violence against Black
Canadians. Black Canadians still experience significant disadvantage and structurally inflicted
violence, but in terms that have been sanitized and taken out of public view. This new subtler
form of anti-Black racism is more difficult to combat insofar as it is now an indistinguishable
feature of society’s institutions, such as the criminal justice system. 130However, despite the
subtleness of current expressions of anti-Black racism, there exists an intractable relationship
between Blackness and crime that continues to inform current understandings of Black
criminality. Scholars who study race and crime generally agree that our system of criminal
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justice is inherently biased and hostile towards racialized people.131Indeed, this bias has suffused
the entire criminal justice system and leads to the over-incarceration and criminalization of Black
Canadians. CRT scholars assert that, “in legal discourse, preconceptions and myths, for example
about black criminality, shape mindset-the bundle of received wisdoms, stock stories, and
suppositions that allocate suspicion, place the burden of proof on one party or the other, and tell
is in cases of divided evidence what probably happened”.132
Racial stereotypes concerning African Canadian criminality, including the belief that
African Canadians are associated with drug trafficking and gun crimes, have resulted in the
overcharging of Black men in those charge categories. 133These beliefs create a self-fulfilling
prophecy regarding Black men’s purported proclivity for committing violent offences.134As
Tanovich aptly asserts: “so long as the police see the face of street level crime as Black, it will
always remain so.”135Admittedly, there is a problem with violence in some Black communities,
which is mostly due to socioeconomic factors. However, if Black people are more likely to
engage in criminality, it may be a symptom of racist structural disadvantage. 136As Paul Butler
explained, albeit in the American context, but which is nonetheless applicable in the Canadian
context:
criminal conduct among African Americans is often a predictable reaction to oppression.
Sometimes black crime is a symptom of internalized white supremacy; other times it is a
reasonable response to the racial and economic subordination every African-American
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faces every day. Punishing black people for the fruits of racism is wrong if that
punishment is premised on the idea that it is the black criminal's "just deserts."137

Indeed, some of the ex-offenders interviewed for this project expressed that Black men are more
likely to be involved in gun and drug crimes. When asked to explain this assertion, one
interviewee stated that having a gun is necessary to survive and to get food.138He furthermore
explained that the court should take that into consideration when sentencing the person.139
There exist a gun and drug problem in some communities across Canada, particularly
Toronto, a fact that was emphasized by most of the ex-offender interviewees.140For many years,
this problem has undergirded the deployment of police resources in primarily Black
communities.141This issue has also been exploited by police to increase their use of racially
motivated investigative methods, i.e. carding.142Criminologists and legal scholars agree that
biased policing is one of the primary conduits through which Black bodies are transported into
the criminal justice system.143There is a general consensus among scholars, which has been
consistently supported by ample empirical evidence that this systemic injustice is a product of
anti-Black racism.144The iconography and accompanying narrative of the ‘dangerous Black man’
is central in the decision-making around who, and how frequently, police officers, investigates,
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arrests, and charges.145It may also guide crown prosecutors about what cases to proceed with,
and ultimately guide judges in their sentencing of Black offenders. 146The resulting influx of
Black offenders before the criminal courts, and in prisons simultaneously produces and
reproduces the notion and narrative of the recalcitrant and dangerous Black man. Thus, antiBlack racism within the criminal justice system, particularly in the policing context, not only
targets Black ‘offenders’ but is also instrumental in their creation.147This narrative, in some
cases, travels with the offender from his initial arrest to the sentencing, which can result in
disproportionate sentences for Black offenders.148For instance, recent studies by the Office of the
Correctional Investigator (“OCI”) have recorded that Black Canadians are over-represented in
the Federal prison population. The OCI found in 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 that while Blacks
represented only 3% of Canada’s population, they make up 8.6% of all those federally
incarcerated.149 This apparent over-representation was also recorded in Ontario.150 In one study it
was found that “Black offenders were most likely to be incarcerated in Ontario.” 151In Jackson,
Justice Nakatsuru commented that “stripped to its essentials, African Canadians have been jailed
three times more than their general representation in society for quite some time. The problem is
not getting better”.152
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There is also cogent evidence to suggest that Blackness is a central consideration in the
public’s perception of sentence appropriateness.153This public perception has existed across
space and time. Studies have found that in Ontario during the late 19th century to the middle of
the 20thcentury, anti-Black stereotypes and attitudes were instrumental in sentencing
outcomes.154These studies show that the over-incarceration of Black bodies is not a new
phenomenon. However, in earlier times, sentencing disparities were more acute, and the reasons
for the unfairness were generally explicitly stated. 155 For instance, some sentencing magistrates
relied on stereotypical narratives and attitudes about Black Canadians in their sentencing of
Black offenders. As Clayton Mosher argues:
in such a climate of perceived threat, we would expect that black violent offenders would
be treated more severely by the criminal courts, especially when they victimized Whites,
and particularly in jurisdictions and in historical periods in which the numbers of Blacks
posed a greater numerical threat to white Canadian society.156

Barrington Walker similarly argues “that when Blacks appeared before the criminal courts,
‘race,’ whether tacitly or overtly, procedurally or rhetorically, was on trial.”157During the periods
under investigation, both Mosher and Walker found that the hysteria about Black dangerousness
and volatility was an integral factor in sentencing determinations.158Race played a prominent role
in sentencing, albeit for pernicious purposes. The offender's Blackness was seen as an
aggravating factor, particularly if the crime involved a white victim, and served as a justification
for his harsh treatment.159Moreover, even in cases where a white offender was convicted of a
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similar offence, the Black offender would receive a harsher punishment.160According to Mosher,
this disparity in punishment was a reaction to the so-called threat that Black bodies posed to
Canadian society.161
Historically “the criminal law was an integral part of how race was produced, managed,
and expressed in the racial liberal order that framed the Black experience in Canada.” 162Black
bodies, however, continue to be coded as dangerous and posing a threat to public safety. There
are no contemporary sentencing decisions that have overtly relied on the so-called causal link
between Blackness and propensity for crime to justify excessive sentences. This transformation
in sentencing decision-making may only represent a change in language but not attitudes, and
indeed, it has had limited impact on sentencing outcomes of Black Canadians. Scholars who
study the over-incarceration of racialized people have consistently reported that Black people are
over-represented in prisons.163The cause of this disparity is multi-dimensional and complex. The
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System found
that “racialized judgments and assumptions may also contribute to differential sentencing. They
may directly influence the decisions of sentencing judges or may be transmitted from decisions
made at earlier stages of the criminal justice process”.164
It would be untenable for even the staunchest supporter of our criminal justice system to
deny the fact that anti-Black racism infects the criminal justice system. As earlier as 1993, in the
case of R v Parks, Doherty JA. held that:
racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community's psyche. A
significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views. A much larger segment
160

Clayton Mosher, ibid.
See generally Clayton Mosher, ibid.
162
Barrington Walker, supra note 1 at 20.
163
Julia Sudbury, supra note 8; Jamil Malakieh, Supra note 14; Shelley Trevethan and Christopher J. Rastin, supra
note 8.
164
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, supra note 4 at 7.
161

38

subconsciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our
institutions, including the criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative
stereotypes. These elements combine to infect our society as a whole with the evil of
racism. Blacks are among the primary victims of that evil.165

Stephen Lewis’ 1992 report on Race Relations in Ontario signalled, at the time, that anti-Black
racism was the most pervasive form of racism in Ontario.166 In 1995 the Report of the
Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System provided even more
incontrovertible evidence to support the fact that anti-Black racism was prevalent within the
criminal justice system.167Today hardly any judge, academician, or lawyer would question the
existence of anti-Black racism in the criminal justice system. However, while its existence is not
in dispute, nor is it as blatant as in previous eras, the impacts on Black communities nonetheless
remain the same.
Section E: Anti-Black Policing
There is a direct and ongoing link between over-incarceration and Black
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. Today, the over-criminalization of Black
people is primarily done through biased policing.168 It is generally accepted that one of the most
insidious current practices of anti-Black racism is the race-based profiling of AfricanCanadians.169Racially biased policing is a method of racialization in that it is used to construct
the usual offender typology.170In R v Richards, quoting from the Intervener African Canadian
Legal Clinic’s factum, racial profiling is defined as:
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criminal profiling based on race. Racial or colour profiling refers to that phenomenon
whereby certain criminal activity is attributed to an identified group in society on the
basis of race or colour resulting in the targeting of individual members of that group. In
this context, race is illegitimately used as a proxy for the criminality or general criminal
propensity of an entire racial group.171

The Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System
found that:
racialized characteristics, especially those of black people, in combination with other
factors, provoke police suspicion, at least in Metro Toronto. Other factors that may attract
police attention include sex (male), youth, make and condition of car (if any), location,
dress, and perceived lifestyle. Black persons perceived to have many of these attributes
are at high risk of being stopped on foot or in cars. This explanation is consistent with our
findings that, overall, black people are more likely than others to experience the
unwelcome intrusion of being stopped by the police, but black people are not equally
vulnerable to such stops.172

Racial profiling generally occurs when police, customs officers and crown prosecutors use race
as a marker of distinction in the exercise of their statutory discretion. 173Beyond the disadvantage,
vulnerability, and stereotyping experienced by African Canadians in the wider society, African
Canadians encounter racial discrimination, specifically in the context of policing. The
disadvantage of African Canadians by the police is perpetuated and reinforced by virulent and
pervasive anti-Black stereotypes. Black communities are generally classified as high-risk, but as
Tanovich argues:
designation [as a] ‘high crime area’ is not so much an accurate reflection that more crime
occurs in the area as compared to other areas in the city, but rather, that the area is overpoliced. Moreover, as a matter of policy, treating the place of the stop as a relevant
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consideration in the reasonable suspicion calculus unduly prejudices low-income and
minority residents.174

There is no reliable scientific evidence that Blacks are more prone to criminality than their nonBlack counterparts. Nevertheless, Black men are generally deemed presumptively dangerous;
and are thereby more likely to be arrested, detained, charged, assaulted and killed by police in
comparison to their white counterparts.175The fusion of Blackness and criminality arguably
undergirds police practices, scrutiny and allocation of resources. Some scholars have even
asserted that racial profiling is law enforcement tool, albeit an unreliable one.176 Through the
vehicle of racial profiling, Black bodies are ‘othered’ and made the subject of unwanted and
extreme scrutiny. Despite Black Canadians’ putative membership in Canadian society, there
exists an almost impassable gulf between him and his non-racialized counterparts. He walks
among them, but he is not one of them.
Othering operates as a justification for the different forms of police interaction
experienced by Black Canadians in comparison to their non-Black counterparts.177 The
stereotypical Black suspect is a central consideration in so-called proactive policing.178 For
example, the creation of a suspect profile may operate as an early method of detecting crime.
Given prevalent stereotypes about Black Canadians’ so-called volatility and dangerousness, they
are usually defined as the archetypal suspect.179For this reason, inter alia, it may be argued that
Black Canadians exist in a perpetual state of criminal liability. It is becoming increasingly
irrefutable, that Black lives are under constant assault by police. Therefore, the unfair

David M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an Equality-Based
Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40:2 Osgoode Hall L J at 91 (LexisNexis).
175
A Collective Impact, supra note 3.
176
David M. Tanovich, supra note 131 at 933.
177
David M. Tanovich, ibid at 916; A Collective Impact, supra note 3.
178
David M. Tanovich, ibid.
179
Ibid.
174

41

presumption of Black dangerousness should be redirected to the police, because it is manifestly
clear that Black Canadians face more danger from those who have sworn to protect their lives.
The prevalence and salience of race-based police discrimination contribute to and entrenches the
general mistrust and ambivalence expressed by Black Canadians towards the criminal justice
system. In Le, which will be discussed in more detail below, the Court accepted that practices
such as carding and racial profiling “contributes to the continuing social exclusion of racial
minorities, encourages a loss of trust in the fairness of our criminal justice system, and
perpetuates criminalization.”180
There are procedural mechanisms entrenched within the Charter that may be used to
eradicate or at least address biased policing. However, there has been a conspicuous erasure of
race in the Court’s Charter jurisprudence, particularly in the Court’s jurisprudence on
policing.181Despite judicial and scholarly recognition of this phenomenon and its damaging
impacts on Black bodies and communities, the Court has only ever marginally engaged in a racebased analysis of the Charter rights that are engaged by police encounters.182Tanovich argues
that since its inception, the Charter has had minimal impact on racial injustice in Canada. Racial
justice he asserts “has not had a chance to grow because of trial and appellate lawyers’ failure to
engage in race talk in the courts and a failure of the judiciary to adopt appropriate critical race
standards when invited to do so.”183
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Section F: Do Black Lives Even Matter?
The criminal justice system has shaped current narratives about Black people and in so
doing, provided the ontological foundations for the denial of Black innocence and humanity.
Many of the ex-offenders interviewed for this project agreed that Blackness and innocence are
mutually exclusive concepts. One interviewee even remarked that even though I can’t see inside
the judge’s mind, I believe that Blacks are sentenced harsher because of our colour.184A.W.'s
comment seems to suggest that, albeit in his own mind, that his mere physical presence provided
the rationale for harsh treatment. What does this statement reveal about how Black Canadians
perceive their bodies? It has been suggested by one commentator that “the black body is not
viewed as being capable of making the progression from the bodily identity to consciousness and
morality that Locke feels is necessary for the governance of, and participation in, civil
society.”185In some sense, degradation has been inscribed on the bodies and psyches of Black
people. A degraded body is ripe for destruction. Criminal punishment is a salient method through
which Black bodies are degraded, and ultimately destroyed. James Q. Whitman, argues that “we
all know intuitively that degradation, in this sense, often plays a significant role in punishment:
part of what makes punishments effective is their power to degrade—their power to make the
person punished feel diminished, lessened, lowered.”186
There exist in Canada, and perhaps more recognizable in the United States, a relationship
between Black bodies and punishment.187Anti-Blackness strips Black bodies of the ability to
express or sense remorse, embody innocence or be worthy of mercy. In other words, Black
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bodies exist in a state of moral blameworthiness and guilt; and is thus always worthy of, and
available for punishment. Degradation does not only occur as a result of criminal punishment;
rather, it permeates the lives of Black Canadians and reduces the value of Blackness. This
systematic devaluation results in social death and a certain “nothingness.”188To put another way,
Black lives do not matter. Calvin L. Warren explains that the question of whether Black lives
matter, “reemerges within a world of antiblack brutality, a world in which black torture,
dismemberment, fatality, and fracturing are routinized and ritualized — a global, sadistic
pleasure principle.”189
To understand anti-Blackness, it is crucial to not only focus on its intellectual
dimensions, but also its aesthetic contours. As Sherene Razack explains, “race is crucial to preemptive punishment” as “risk is read on the body.”190Razack makes this claim in the context of
the war on terror and its relationship with Muslim bodies. Her basic premise, however, applies to
what can only be characterized as a war on Blackness. Any discourse of risk is inherently race-d
as we pre-emptively read risk on certain bodies. Black bodies are inscribed with notions of risk,
lethality, and danger, and in some sense, have become weaponized.191These inscriptions support
the presupposition that Black bodies are to be approached with caution and in some cases, met
with pre-emptive violence. Moreover, anti-Blackness can be characterized as constructing an
Agambenian ‘state of exception’, wherein the very existence Black bodies creates a permanent
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state of emergency.192 In international public law scholarship, most notably works on the war on
terror, in times of emergency, the sovereign is justified in exempting itself from the established
legal order.193 The state of exception doctrine “can be best described as a move from defence to
prevention or as a move from deterrence to risk management.”194However, Scheuerman argues
that “rulers exploit crisis situations to augment their personal and institutional power, relying on
emergencies to transform the existing legal framework.”195
The Black crisis/emergency (“the war on Blackness”) is not a Black creation; instead, it
is the consequence of an evolution of hate that has been mobilized and manipulated to keep
peoples of African descent subjugated and oppressed. The need to dominate and punish Black
bodies has continued unabated since slavery. This intergenerational and systemic oppression of
Black peoples has created a deeply entrenched sense of vigilance and fear within the collective
Black psyche. Critical Black psychologists, social workers, and trauma workers have
characterized this experience as post-traumatic slavery disorder.196Research into this trauma is
reshaping and revolutionizing our understanding of Black trauma and its various manifestations.
At the core of this scholarship “is to call attention to an array of attitudes, habits and behaviours
which clearly follow a direct lineage to slavery.”197While slavery is no longer a physical reality
for Black Canadians, its lingering effects are viscerally felt through the over-criminalization of
the Black body.198Indeed, punishment continues to define the relationship between the state and
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African Canadians. This statement is not born out of racial paranoia, as there exists ample
sociological data that supports the notion that it is dangerous to be Black in Canada.199Despite
these studies, we are still faced with the same fundamental problem - police misuse and abuse of
their powers in their interactions with African Canadians. Akwatu Khenti argues that
“unbeknownst to many Canadians, Black communities in Canada have been the target of
intensive policing since the inception of the War on Drugs in the 1980s, especially in the
province of Ontario where most Blacks reside”.200He further argues that a: “direct result of the
inordinate police focus on Black communities has been a pattern of racialized mass
incarceration, exemplified by a vast overrepresentation of Blacks within the federal offender
population in prisons across Canada.”201
Section G: Beyond Anti-Black Policing
Anti-Black policing is one of several methods through which Black bodies are
criminalized. There exist other feeder systems that are equally as complicit in the streaming of
Black bodies into the criminal justice system, not the least of which is the educational system.202
This phenomenon is often referred to as the school-to-prison pipeline.203Sibblis argues that
school expulsion programs operate as carceral spaces for Black bodies.204She further explains
that “the carceral spaces within the educational system are a constant reminder to black students
of their abnormality, incompetence and perniciousness.”205Studies have concluded that Black
students are disproportionately suspended and expelled and subjected to harsher punishments
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compared to their similarly situated white counterparts.206 The disciplining of Black students is,
in many ways, similar to the treatment of Black offenders and suspects. Sibblis asserts that:
the civilian (student) outside of the prison is inside of another prison - the classroom. As
he puts it, the outside is always already inside. For these students there is no exit-no
escape in life from imprisonment and violence. If black students are criminalized and
incarcerated in schools, one of their first identity-forming, socializing institutions, where
can they be safe from violence? The one thing that schools-turned-carceral spaces teach
the students contained within is that violence is endemic to all institutions and likely, all
spaces.207

A discussion about the school-to-prison pipeline, and similar feeder engines, child welfare, etc.,
to the criminal justice system, is crucial in understanding the intricate and devastating web of
violence experienced by Black Canadians. However, a more fulsome discussion of this
phenomenon is beyond the scope of this project. Suffice it to say, addressing any one system in
isolation will not properly elucidate the complex nature of anti-Black racism and its various
manifestations. To fully appreciate the impact that anti-Black racism has had on an individual’s
life, it is critically important to understand the convergence of various oppressive experiences
throughout that person’s life. Anti-Black racism cannot be summed up in one explanatory
statement; it is the aggregate of a lifetime of experiences rooted in slavery and intergenerational
trauma. However, it should be noted that “anti-Black racism does not affect all Blacks in the
same way. Just as blackness itself is hotly contested, the vile practice of anti-Black racism is also
an uneven territory with varying contours”.208The immediate goal of this thesis, however, is to
address anti-Black racism in ‘a specific’ moment/experience: namely, during criminal
sentencing.
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Section H: CIARs/IRCARs and Sentencing Reform (A Partial Solution?)
Given that over-policing is one among a constellation of factors that leads to the overincarceration of Black Canadians, it is, therefore, a partial causal explanation for the
phenomenon that CIARs/IRCARs are seeking to redress. There are other sources of oppression
that contribute in equal part to this problem, i.e. education, child welfare, etc. The routine use of
IRCARs/CIARs may be a catalyst for sentencing reform, but is at best, a partial solution for the
over-criminalization and disproportionate incarceration of African Canadians, and the broader
problem of anti-Black racism. This issue can also be attributed to decisions made at all other
phases of the criminal justice process, including legislation, policing, charging/prosecutorial
discretion, plea-bargaining, adjudication by judges/juries, parole hearings, etc. Moreover, the
over-criminalization of Black bodies also relates to broader antecedent problems of anti-Black
racism that result in more African Canadians finding themselves on the “assembly line” 209 of the
criminal justice system. To address this issue requires a radical multi-system critique and perhaps
a wholesale dismantling of these structures of violence. Sentencing reform, through the extensive
use of CIARs/IRCARs, is, in some sense conservative, since it seeks to work within the criminal
justice system's existing norms and structures. The current norms and structures of the existing
criminal justice system are flawed, and intrinsically racist, and cannot coexist with genuine racial
equality.210In that vein, sentencing reform may not be a workable or desirable solution to the
problem of the over-criminalization and over-incarceration of Black bodies and the broader
problem of anti-Black racism.
Notwithstanding the call for a radical structural critique of our current criminal justice
system, it is laudable that proponents of IRCARs/CIARs seek to use the “master’s tool to
209
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dismantle the master’s house.”211By attempting to achieve racial equality within a structure that
is infected with racism, IRCARs/CIARs, in a sense, seek to have the system ‘turn on itself.’ The
aim is to create the procedural space to discuss Blackness – not merely as a means of
acknowledging what is already a notorious fact, but by fundamentally altering the current
sentencing regime and its hostility to Black bodies. However, there is reason to believe that this
change may only be achieved through legislative intervention. For now, sentencing reform for
Black Canadians may only be achieved through judicial intervention sparked by the increased
usage of IRCARs/CIARs. These reports are designed to highlight specific cultural, social, and
political mitigating factors that ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian
offenders.212The objective of these reports, which will be discussed in more detail below, is to,
inter alia, highlight an offender’s Blackness in order to, paradoxically, diminish the racist
attributions generally assigned to Blackness. The idea is that emphasizing race, during the
sentencing phase, will lead to more proportionate sentences. A primary objective of progressive
criminal justice reform, arguably, should be the promotion and facilitation of proportionate
sentences for Black Canadians.
As discussed above, bias at the sentencing phase results in harsher and disproportionate
sentences for Black offenders compared to their similarly-situated white counterparts, thereby
exacerbating the problem of the over-incarceration of Black bodies in correctional facilities at
both the Federal and Provincial level.213IRCARs/CIARs strive to draw attention to this
phenomenon and attempt to ameliorate this injustice. They aim to propagate a counter-narrative
that rejects the myth of colour-blindness and provides an interpretive frame that displays a more
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robust picture of the offender. The next section of this thesis will explore whether
IRCARs/CIARs can be salutary within the current sentencing regime.
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Chapter Three: Sentencing Theory and the Black Experience
Section A: Proportionality and Blame
Why we punish and how we punish are deep philosophical questions that are brought into
sharp relief when we consider the fundamental principle of criminal sentencing.214 The current
sentencing regime under section 718 of the Criminal Code is premised on the fundamental
principle of proportionality and retribution.215While retribution is not expressly part of the
section 718 framework, it is implicit in the notion of proportionality as enshrined in the Criminal
Code and expounded by the Court.216Both the fundamental principle of proportionality and
retribution aims to apportion and calibrate blame. Proportionate sentences/punishments must
consider both the gravity of the crime and the offender's level of blameworthiness.217However,
blameworthiness, particularly in the context of structural racism, is profoundly controversial and
anathema to Black communities. The concept of blame is rendered hollow when we are
considering the crimes committed by people who have minimal opportunities and options due to
structural violence. Black Canadians are stereotyped as incorrigible, inherently violent,
blameworthy and dangerous due to racist stereotypes that were part of the logic of slavery, and
today, we determine criminal sentences in part by trying to determine the extent to which an
offender is: violent, incorrigible, blameworthy and dangerous. As Paul Butler argues, we are
essentially “punishing people for "negative" reactions to racist, oppressive conditions.”218
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Scholars assert that proportionality functions as a restraint mechanism against grossly
severe punishments or those that are unjustifiably lenient.219The offender ought to be punished
fairly - no more or less than he deserves. Thus, the duty of a sentencing judge is to strike an
appropriate and fair balance of just deserts. He or she must weigh complicated and contradictory
factors.220Some scholars have examined whether social deprivation should be a factor in this
balancing exercise.221Others assert that “the institution of criminal punishment is not an
appropriate ‘instrument’ to resolve social problems.222Retributivists assert that proportionality is
an equitable concept because it seeks to curb arbitrary punishment and ensure parity in
sentencing allocation.223According to Von Hirsch “when proportionality is disregarded,
offenders are unfairly visited, through the penalties imposed on them, with more implicit blame
(or less) than the actual blameworthiness of their conduct warrants.”224Therefore,
proportionality, from a retributive perspective, is understood as a theory of justice that allocates
punishment based on the fair distribution of blame/desert.
As mentioned above, blameworthiness, as it is understood within our current sentencing
framework, is an insidious and controversial concept within Black communities. Strict adherence
to the proportionality/blameworthiness framework may actually result in injustice for Black
offenders. As Carol Steiker argues, “retributivism’s chief distortion is its inability to take account
of the effects of widespread social and economic inequality on its central determination of
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desert.”225There is ample evidence to suggest that our system of criminal justice is skewed
towards the over-punishment of Black offenders.226Some scholars have even advocated for the
introduction of mercy into criminal sentencing as a means of (over)correcting for this “punitive
turn.”227
Section B: Creating Space for Mercy
Mercy is an elusive concept that has intrigued theologians, philosophers and jurists for
generations.228The scholarly literature on mercy is abundant and spans both time and discipline.
Thus, it is beyond the scope of this project to provide an exhaustive treatment of mercy. It will
suffice, however, for current purposes, to briefly sketch three (3) possible ways in which mercy
can be understood within criminal sentencing, specifically in the context of race-based
sentencing. First, the thesis will consider whether, in some instances, it is appropriate for
sentencing judges to dispense mercy as a means of displacing justice in pursuit of other relevant
social goals.229Second, it will discuss whether proportionality can be achieved through the
granting of merciful sentences that aim to (over)correct the inherent bias towards over-punishing
Black Canadians.230Third, it will explore how mercy tracks with notions of hierarchy and
degradation.231
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Before commencing a more specific discussion on how mercy may achieve racial justice,
it is critical to provide a brief definition of the concept. In the sentencing context, mercy
connotes the granting of a gift, in the form of reduced punishment, from a sentencing judge to an
offender.232The offender has no right, nor does he deserve this gift on account of him conducting
himself in a manner that appropriately attracts censure or punishment. Therefore, when a
sentencing judge dispenses mercy, she is acting magnanimously towards someone undeserving.
Some scholars, however, argue that mercy may be fundamentally incompatible with the demands
of justice insofar as granting mercy, in some cases, may require deviations from justice. 233There
is a concern that mercy cannot coexist with justice as the demands of both are, at times, mutually
exclusive. The question is, “whether mercy can be a public value at all and whether it has any
place in a properly functioning criminal justice system.”234For example, imagine an offender
who is convicted of committing a serious offence that ought to attract a significant jail term, but
who instead receives probation on account of the sentencing judge showing him leniency. From
a retributivist perspective, such a result is not in accordance with the principle of proportionality,
which requires an offender to be punished commensurate with the seriousness of the offence and
his level of blameworthiness.235However, while mercy may be in contention with justice, this
does not render mercy an illegitimate factor for consideration in a retributive/proportionalitybased sentencing framework.236
It is possible that in some situations to achieve justice, particularly racial justice, it may
be necessary to temper the demands of justice with mercy. Mercy may provide a way for
thinking through other goals the State can legitimately pursuit, apart from, or in addition to the
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imperatives of proportionate justice. It frames alternative imperatives that may exist in
contention with retribution/proportionality accounts of sentencing but is also properly considered
by the criminal law and the State.237On this account, there may be justifiable reasons to deviate
from proportionate justice through the granting of disproportionately reduced sentences to Black
offenders. For example, the State may grant mercy as a means of seeking to redress historical
wrongs, which serves to communicate messages to the community and the accused person that
does not fixate on the offender’s blameworthiness.238There is ongoing debate by retributivist
scholars around the appropriateness of mercy within the criminal justice system, particularly as a
means of redressing social ills. There are, however, examples in the procedural realm, for
instance, under subsection 24(2) of the Charter, were judges routinely compromise truth-seeking
values in order to condemn improper State conduct.239In that vein, it is reasonable for
CIARs/IRCARs to seek deviations from retributive/proportionality values in order to condemn
State and societal behaviour as it relates to virulent anti-Black racism.
However, mercy talk, like race talk, elicits discomfort and controversy. Indeed, this
approach would be considered a radical departure from the current sentencing paradigm
contemplated by section 718 of the Criminal Code, and as expounded in Gladue and Ipeelee.240
Under this regime, proportionality sets both the ceiling and floor for punishment. Thus, any
further considerations simply operate to assist in calibrating a proportionate sentence. The goal is
to allocate punishment based on a fair distribution of blame/desert. However, blame is a
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deceptive concept within Black communities. Indeed, what may be deemed as a proportionate
sentence for a Black offender may, in fact, on more objective measures, be disproportionate and
unduly harsh. As Steiker argues:
if sentences were subject to review for comparative proportionality (i.e., have a similarly
harsh sentences been imposed in the past for similar conduct?) and for equal protection
(i.e., are different racial, ethnic, and geographic groups sentenced similarly for similar
conduct?), both the amount and the distribution of criminal punishment would likely
change for the better.241

She further asserts that mercy is not incompatible with proportionality if it is regarded as
corrective, i.e. as a means of prompting proportionality in systems that are predictably too
harsh.242For instance, given that certain people are routinely over-punished, a sentence that
seems “merciful” in the sense of being disproportionately low, maybe more commensurate with
blameworthiness, and hence more proportionate. Indeed, equal sentences for similarly situated
offenders, without regard to demographic status, are not merciful – they are the baseline for
formal equality. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to radically overcorrect for the inherent bias
towards harshness when dealing with Black offenders. In that vein, to correct this bias may
require sentencing judges to grant, what may appear at first glance, to be a lenient sentence but
one which is, in fact, proportionate.
At the same time, “mercy” suggests attention to other normative considerations beyond
retributivist/proportionate punishment, such as forgiveness, humility, etc. that could properly
play a role in criminal justice. 243However, there are concerns that mercy may track with notions
of hierarchy, power and degradation.244On this account, mercy involves performances of power
differentials, which in some cases may exacerbate and reinforce prevailing societal
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hierarchies.245As a Black man, who has been on both sides of this punitive turn, as an offender
and then defence counsel, I am attracted to the notion that racial justice can displace or at the
very least, temper the fervour of retribution. However, some of the ex-offenders interviewed for
this project did not desire mercy/leniency - instead, they sought equal treatment (same treatment
as his similarly-situated white counterpart). One interviewee opined that he desired the same
treatment as a white accused and did not want his race or the circumstances brought on by that
status, to strip him of the dignity of being punished like a white man who committed a
comparable offence. He remarked that if I deserve the punishment, then I deserve it. To treat me
otherwise is undignified.246This statement suggests that the ex-offender would rather the
adoption of the 'fiction' of colour-blindness in his/her sentencing analysis. Another interviewee,
worried that an over-exaggeration of his race may result in the aggravation of his sentence; thus,
he prescribes utter silence about race, whether for mitigation purposes or as a plea for mercy. 247
It is not difficult to see how a plea for mercy or leniency may be perceived as an affront to a
Black man’s dignity. The wounds of slavery are still fresh, and the images are etched in the
Black community’s collective psyche. Thus, pleading to a white judge may be construed as a
reversion in dignity. Equal treatment, even if it means harsh treatment, is more welcomed than
preferential treatment grounded in white compassion.
The current punitive climate disproportionately impacts Black Canadians, thereby
‘drying’ up what little mercy may exist for Black offenders facing punishment. This argument,
however, presupposes that mercy can/should only flow uni-directionally. IRCARs/CIARs
operate as a means of promoting and facilitating a bilateral flow of mercy. This approach can be
245
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conceptualized as a shared grant of mercy. One in which both parties, the State and Black
offenders, seek and grant mercy. The proposed approach imagines a situation whereby the State
seeks mercy from Black Canadians by providing quantitatively and qualitatively better sentences
for Black offenders, and in turn, a Black offender may feel morally emancipated when he or she
makes a plea for mercy. This approach is a dignity affirming compromise. It is not about
compensating for past wrongs; instead, it serves as the repatriation of stolen/lost dignity.
Section C: Personal Narrative (My Experience with Mercy)
I have been arrested many times. Several of those arrests resulted in criminal charges.
Fortunately, I have only ever been found guilty once. This finding of guilt was the result of a
crack charge I caught following a sloppy drug deal. I had just left the home of one of my
customers (“custy”). As I left his house, I broke a few cardinal rules: I placed the remaining
crack in my pocket; I permitted my driver, a custy, to travel with his crack pipe; and, I also
travelled with a friend who was “packing” (armed with a gun). As we drove along the road, I
sensed that we were being followed. I attempted to tell the driver to find a different route, but by
that time, it was too late. I saw the lights and heard the sirens. It was an undercover police
vehicle. They approached the car with guns drawn. They saw the driver’s crack pipe in plain
sight. I was ordered out of the vehicle and searched. The police found a gram of crack and a
knife in my pants pocket. My friend was searched, and a gun was found in his waistband. We
were all arrested and charged. I was charged with possessing one (1) gram of crack cocaine for
the purpose of trafficking and possessing a dangerous weapon. I managed to secure bail.
Following a few court appearances, my lawyer implored me to plead guilty. The crown
prosecutor wanted a jail sentence. My lawyer sought a conditional discharge or suspended
sentence. I pleaded guilty. My lawyer made his argument for a conditional discharge. He
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emphasized that I did not have a criminal record, I was caught with only a small amount of
crack, I was a youthful offender, and I was enrolled in an adult high school program. The Crown
argued for jail. He emphasized the fact that my co-accused was found with a gun. He also relied
on cases that, despite the mitigating factors I listed, still supported a short stint in jail. After the
submissions, the judge invited me to address the court. I felt a sense of dissociation.
The entire courtroom was white. I was in Gatineau, Quebec. The judge, defence lawyer,
Crown, court staff, police officers and court service officers were all white. I was the only Black
body in the courtroom. They were all speaking French. My lawyer and the judge were the only
individuals that spoke to me in English. I stared blankly at the judge and muttered something that
I now realize must have been incoherent drivel. The judge thanked me and then stared at me
sternly. He spoke perfect English. He was ‘perfectly’ white. No one mentioned anything about
my race or culture. But at that moment, I felt extremely Black. I whispered to myself: I am going
to jail. Then the judge said something that still puzzles me to this day. He said, Mr. Jones, you
are young and have potential. I will not burden you with a criminal record. I accept your
lawyer’s submissions and will grant you a conditional discharge. I was startled. As were the
Crown and the police officers. I walked out of the courthouse not understanding what had taken
place. The lesson I learned at the time was to avoid selling drugs in Quebec. However, the
judge’s words stayed with me. They haunted me. He saw potential in me and a person deserving
of compassion, whereas all I saw in him was the whiteness that I was taught to be frightened of.
Section D: The Gladue Influence
African Canadians are not the only targets of racism within the criminal justice system.
Evidence suggests that Indigenous peoples are also among the oppressed victims of the
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system.248The Court examined this issue in the case of R v Gladue.249 The appellant, Jamie Tanis
Gladue, pled guilty to manslaughter in the stabbing death of her common-law partner. At her
sentencing hearing, the judge determined that he would not consider the indigeneity of both the
accused and the victim. He sentenced her to three years imprisonment. Ms. Gladue’s appeal to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal was dismissed. The issue before the Court was the proper
interpretation of subsection 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which reads as follows:
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following
principles:
...
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the
circumstances of aboriginal offenders.250

Subsection 718.2(e) was introduced in 1996, following numerous, longstanding calls for judicial
and legislative action.251For the first time, Parliament explicitly recognized the need for a
different sentencing framework for Indigenous offenders. In Gladue, the Court constructed a new
sentencing methodology for lower court judges tasked with sentencing Indigenous offenders.252
The Court reaffirmed its position in R v Wells and later in R v Ipeelee.253The restraint principle,
enshrined in subsection 718.2(e), instructs courts to use imprisonment as a last resort, paying
particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. The Court discussed that there
existed an over-incarceration problem in Canada, particularly as it relates to Indigenous
offenders. They also found that “overreliance upon incarceration is a problem with the general
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population (but) is of much greater concern in the sentencing of aboriginal Canadians.”254The
Court determined that subsection 718.2(e) is remedial legislation that “is designed to ameliorate
the serious problem of overrepresentation of aboriginal people in prisons, and to encourage
sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing.”255Thus, subsection
718.2(e) provided the statutory framework that ushered in the Court’s methodological shift in the
sentencing of Indigenous offenders.
Since this landmark decision, courts have been empowered to consider relevant systemic
and background factors in the sentencing of an Indigenous offender. Since Gladue, defence
lawyers proffer systemic and background evidence in the form of a Gladue report to provide the
sentencing judge with a picture of the offender in order to provide the necessary circumstances
for judicial consideration.256This evidence is considered along with the judge’s own taking of
judicial notice about the plight of Indigenous peoples in Canada, both in a historical and
contemporaneous context.257
The critical thing to note is that subsection 718.2(e) applies to all offenders, not just
Indigenous offenders.258Jonathan Rudin has even asserted that this subsection has actually
“largely benefitted non-Aboriginal people.”259Though the subsection mentions all offenders, the
Gladue decision was meant to address and attempt to ameliorate the over-imprisonment of
Indigenous peoples.260By adhering to the principles expounded in Gladue, sentencing “judges
can ensure that systemic factors do not lead inadvertently to discrimination in sentencing.”261The
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Court dismissed criticisms that the subsection and its interpretation amounted to nothing more
than a race-based discount that “invites sentencing judges to impose more lenient sentences” on
Aboriginal offenders.262 The Court further explained that systemic and background factors might
have a significant impact on the moral blameworthiness of an offender insofar that it may
constrain that individual's options for “positive development.”263As Lebel J. stated in Ipeelee:
many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations of social and economic
deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limited options for positive
development….The existence of such circumstances may also indicate that a sanction that
takes account of the underlying causes of the criminal conduct may be more appropriate
than one only aimed at punishment per se.264

It is, however, critical to explore the post-Gladue scholarship that criticized the decision’s
efficacy in ameliorating the Indigenous incarceration problem in Canada. For example, Phillip
Stenning and Julian V. Roberts criticized the Court’s prioritization of indigeneity where, they
argue, the critical cause for concern was social disadvantage.265Essentially these scholars argued
that there was nothing unique or special about this particular offender population. The
Indigenous experience within the criminal justice system was not any different from other
marginalized and socially disadvantaged groups. Thus, no special recognition should be given to
this group lest it results in unfairness to similarly situated offenders.266Critics of this argument,
particularly Jonathan Rudin and Kent Roach, responded by explaining that how Aboriginal
offenders experience social disadvantage is different from other groups that do not share the
history that Aboriginal peoples have with the Canadian State. This history is rooted in
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colonialism.267In a later paper, Rudin, however, questions the efficacy of the Gladue and Ipeelee
decisions on reducing incarceration rates.268Indeed, since the Gladue decision, Indigenous
incarceration rates have remained at disproportionate levels.269
Section E: Applying Gladue Principles to Black offenders?
There is a paucity of literature examining the connections between anti-Black racism and
criminal sentencing. Canadian Scholars have instead focused primarily on the relationship
between indigeneity and sentencing. This scholarly focus is understandable, given the
disproportionate rates at which Indigenous people (male and female) are imprisoned in Canadian
penal institutions; and, the fact that, in response, Canadian legislators and judges have developed
a distinct sentencing regime for Indigenous offenders. In Gladue, the Court held that judges
tasked with sentencing an Indigenous offender must consider:
(a)the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing
the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and (b) the types of sentencing
procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender
because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.270

This case-specific information may take the form of a presentence report/or Gladue report that
compiles relevant systemic and background information about the offender and may make
recommendations about appropriate culturally salient sentences.271In this sense, Gladue reports
are not analogous to section 721 pre-sentence reports (“PSRs”), which generally does not include
cultural relevant information or provides the basis for restorative sentencing options. 272Gladue
reports are prepared by trained Indigenous caseworkers, unlike PSRs that are often prepared by
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probation officers who may lack the necessary cultural lens to produce a report that aids a
sentencing judge in formulating a proportionate sentence for an Indigenous offender.273
CIARs/IRCARS are similar to Gladue reports insofar as they are often prepared by clinical
social workers and race and crime scholars with an anti-oppression and anti-racist lens. They
provide an assessment of the offender’s background and social circumstances and how these
likely influenced the offender’s decision to commit the offence for which he or she is being
sentenced. Like, Gladue reports, CIARs/IRCARs are not simply pre-sentence reports. They do,
however, share some similarities with Gladue reports. For instance, CIARs provide judges with
insights about systemic racism and other structural inequalities. They also provide “a more
textured, multi-dimensional framework for understanding the defendant, his background and his
behaviours.”274
While there exists no clear legislative and jurisprudential basis to consider the social and
cultural circumstances of Black offenders when crafting a sentence, in theory, CIARs/IRCARs
like Gladue reports should assist sentencing judges in achieving proportionality and advance
current sentencing goals (i.e. denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.). However, there are
questions around whether these sentencing reference points can be harnessed to promote justice.
It is essential to think critically about these sentencing goals and the notion of proportionality
considering the current debates around general sentencing theory expounded above. Given that
the blueprint and justification for CIARs/IRCARs are similar to the methodology/structure
offered by the Court in Gladue, Wells and Ipeelee, scholarly analyses of Gladue reports can be
cautiously applied to the CIAR/IRCAR context. Indeed, the Indigenous experience is instructive
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in understanding the potential and pitfalls of the CIARs/IRCARs movement, given that this
movement is in its infancy.
It may also be helpful to consider the potential and pitfalls around the fight against antiBlack racial profiling. It is widely accepted that the criminalization of Blackness is the impetus
behind anti-Black policing, and the disparity in Black incarceration rates.275Despite this
recognition, anti-Black policing practices, for instance carding, pretext stops, overcharging,
unreasonable searches, and arbitrary detentions, continue to result in a high number of
prosecutions. It is, however, rarely the case that defence counsel will challenge the police’s
misconduct, and if challenged it is seldom accepted by the court.276However, there have been
some notable successes, most recently in Le, which will be discussed in detail below.
Section F: Confronting Blackness in Sentencing
Canadian courts inadequately address the issue of Blackness, and criminal justice, not
just at the guilt phase of the criminal process but more acutely at sentencing. It has only been
recently that some judges have begun to consider with any seriousness the role Blackness plays
in sentencing considerations.277The IRCAR/CIAR movement has proved to be a sort of
renaissance insofar as it may have sparked a willingness for some defence lawyers, crowns and
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judges to begin to meaningfully engage with the notion of Blackness and its place in Canadian
sentencing law.278
IRCARs/CIARs were introduced, respectively, in 2014 in Nova Scotia279 and 2018 in
Ontario.280Before the introduction of these reports, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Borde
(“Borde”) held that in some instances sentencing judges are justified in considering systemic and
background factors - if those factors are linked to the commission of the offence and the
offender’s community values.281Since Borde, there have several reported Ontario and Nova
Scotia sentencing decisions where the race and culture of African-Canadian offenders are
explicitly discussed.282A few decisions in the Provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba and
the Territory of Yukon that has dealt with this issue tangentially.283Judges in Nova Scotia and
Ontario have, however, taken up this issue in a more direct manner by accepting
CIARs/IRCARs, or by taking judicial notice, to assist them in understanding the links between
Blackness and the offence committed. However, given the decision in Hamilton, one may
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question the efficacy of CIARs/IRCARs in Ontario.284This decision stands for the proposition
that an offender’s membership in a historically marginalized, oppressed and disadvantaged group
does not in and of itself justify mitigation of sentence. 285Despite this challenge, some lawyers
have recently been deploying CIARs/IRCARs as a means of highlight specific cultural, social,
and political mitigating factors that ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian
offenders.
R v “X” in Nova Scotia and Jackson, in Ontario, are the first cases to utilize
CIARs/IRCARs.286In the seminal case of X, defence counsel sought to have an expert in race and
culture qualified as an expert and also to have his report on the impact of race and culture
adduced into evidence. The facts of this case, as will be explored below, demonstrated a similar
‘brand’ of Black criminality and offender typology. The offender is a stereotypically angry,
reckless, violent young-Black-male who was raised by a single mother. His offending behaviour
is equally as predictable: usually involving the possession or trafficking of crack cocaine,
shootings, homicides, and unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. CIARs/IRCARs are
similar to Gladue reports insofar as they are used to provide critical systemic and background
factors in the sentencing of Black offenders. These reports also address, inter alia, anti-Black
racism and aim to promote better, more tailored and proportionate sentences for Black offenders.
They strive to construct a sentencing methodology that balances the significance of the twin
principles of individual responsibility and proportionality while incorporating the cultural
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legacies and historical oppressions and their role in the sentencing of Black bodies/offenders. In
Gladue it was held that “systemic and background factors explain in part the incidence of crime
and recidivism for non‑aboriginal offenders as well.”287Like Indigenous offenders, the plight of
African Canadian offenders in the Canadian criminal justice system is well recognized. 288The
aim is not to equate the plight of both groups. Such a conflation would diminish the unique
relationship that each group has with the State. In Gladue, and later in Wells, and Ipeelee the
Court affirmed the uniqueness of Indigenous cultures and offenders. The Court’s affirmation of
this group’s uniqueness is not to be confused as a euphemism for sacredness.289Some critics
argue that all socially disadvantaged people face similar challenges before sentencing courts and
therefore, social disadvantage should be the primary factor for consideration.290Recognition of
race or social disadvantage, however, has largely been rendered hollow by the work of racially
biased police officers, prosecutors, and judges.
There is little scholarly and jurisprudential focus on the role that an African Canadian
offender’s race, colour and ethnicity should or does play in the crafting of a fit and just sentence.
Some courts have grappled with this issue but with minimal success291, which raises the
question: is Blackness being discounted at the sentencing stage of the criminal process?
Alternatively, do we run the risk of reducing Blackness as merely a tool for sentencing
mitigation? More to the point, does the reliance or utilization of CIARs/IRCARS in the
sentencing of African Canadian offenders deflect from individual responsibility and
287
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proportionality and places undue emphasis on the cultural legacies and historical oppressions,
mistreatment and disadvantages of African Canadians? There is currently no legislative or
jurisprudential basis for CIARs/IRCARs; in fact, one of the only favourable judicial treatment of
this sentencing innovation in Ontario is under appeal.292An IRCAR writer interviewed for this
project remarked that the outcome of the R v Morris (“Morris”) appeal would either advance
racial justice for Black Canadians or set this group back 20 years. 293She commented that the
swiftness of the reaction to Morris might necessitate some legislative input or policy shift. One
of the defence lawyers that was interviewed shared her concern. H.D. commented that while
positive, IRCARs/CIARS currently rest on unstable jurisprudential ground.294She, however, did
not take issue with the reasoning in Jackson or Morris; instead, she expressed concern with the
lack of judicial support since these decisions were rendered.
Indeed, and as mentioned above, there has been some judicial resistance to these
decisions in Ontario.295This resistance does not seem to be as pronounced in Nova Scotia, where
CIARs are routinely accepted in sentencing cases involving African Nova Scotian offenders.
This willingness may be explained, in part, by the relative homogeneity of the Black Nova
Scotian population. It is also accepted, despite not being a part of the national narrative, that the
historic relationship between Canada and Black Nova Scotians was grounded in slavery,
segregation and other forms anti-Black oppression.296The Black experience in Ontario may be
slightly different. For instance, most of the Black inhabitants in Ontario are relatively new to
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Canada compared to their counterparts in Nova Scotia.297Thus, it is perhaps less cumbersome
and controversial to establish a direct historical link between the State violence and current social
problems facing Black Nova Scotians. There may, however, be some difficulty in establishing a
causal link in the case of a recent Black immigrant.298
Section G: A Long Walk to Jackson
In Borde, the Court of Appeal for Ontario was called upon to interpret, inter alia, the
parameters of subsection 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. Specifically, the appellant invited the
court to consider whether the similarities in the plight of Indigenous peoples and Black
Canadians warranted a similar methodological approach in the sentencing of both classes of
offenders as enshrined in subsection 718.2(e) and as outlined in Gladue. The offender, Mr.
Borde, was 18 years old at the time of the offence and 19 years old when he was sentenced. He
plead guilty to aggravated assault, possession of a loaded restricted handgun, using a firearm in
the commission of an indictable offence and breaching his recognizance. In sentencing Mr.
Borde, the trial judge considered his lengthy youth record, which included entries for violent
crimes and sentenced him to five years and two months’ imprisonment. Mr. Borde appealed the
sentencing decision.
On the appeal, Mr. Borde’s lawyer, David Tanovich, applied to the court to admit fresh
evidence to inform the court about the systemic and background factors experienced by Black
males generally in Canada, and those in Toronto’s Regent Park community specifically. The
court declined to admit the fresh evidence about the systemic racism and background factors
faced by Black males in Toronto. Moreover, the court reasoned that, despite the importance of
297
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these factors in determining a fit and just sentence for Black offenders, they would not affect the
length of the sentence even if they were considered, given the seriousness of Mr. Borde’s crime.
The court, however, reduced Mr. Borde’s sentence to four years and two months in light of his
youth and also given that this was his first penitentiary sentence.
In Hamilton299, Justice Hill sitting in Brampton – a court that deals with a majority of the
drug importation cases given its proximity to the Pearson International Airport – accepted the
guilty plea of Ms. Hamilton, who admitted to swallowing 90 pellets of pure cocaine. She was
consequently convicted of importing cocaine into Canada. Ms. Hamilton had no criminal
antecedents. In considering a fit and just sentence, Justice Hill considered her race, gender and
economic conditions. However, these issues were not raised by counsel. Justice Hill conducted
his own research into the issue of race, gender, and poverty. He also took judicial notice of the
fact that a disproportionate amount of the drug “mules” that came before him were poor Black
mothers. He reasoned that the choices of these women were severely constrained by socioeconomic factors that combined made these women particularly vulnerable to conscription by
drug dealers to act as couriers. Thus, given society's complicity in the creation of these offenders'
plight, it was befitting that society bore some of the blame by taking its share of the
responsibility for the offenders’ offences. Justice Hill sentenced Ms. Hamilton to a conditional
sentence despite sentencing jurisprudence that required a lengthy penitentiary sentence, given the
quantity and purity of the drugs imported into Canada by the offenders. The crown appealed the
sentencing decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal, in a decision penned by Justice Doherty, held that Justice Hill
assumed the combined role of advocate, witness and judge and thereby severely compromised
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the appearance of judicial impartiality.300Justice Doherty found that it was improper for Justice
Hill to conduct his own research about issues related to the intersection between race, gender and
poverty. This duty fell on counsel – not the trial judge. If the trial judge had concerns about these
issues, then it should be raised with counsel who will determine whether those issues are
germane to the case. It is improper for the trial judge to inject himself into the proceedings. The
Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge erred in sentencing the offenders to conditional
sentences and reasoned that, where the offence is sufficiently serious, imprisonment will be the
only reasonable response regardless of the ethnic or cultural background of the offender. Ms.
Hamilton’s sentence was altered to 20 months incarceration. However, the court determined that
the ends of justice would be served by allowing her to complete her conditional sentence, as
opposed to imprisonment for the few months that remained on her sentence.301
Hamilton was a watershed case insofar as it was one of the first appellate decision to
consider how judicial perceptions of Blackness should inform sentencing outcomes. The
sentencing judge determined that, given structural racism, the accused’s level of moral
blameworthiness was attenuated. Thus, he sentenced the accused to a conditional sentence even
though the sentencing range for cocaine importation, particularly of that purity level, was a
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significant penitentiary sentence. As discussed above, the sentence was overturned on appeal,
and the sentencing judge was sharply rebuked for his purported judicial activism. Following
Hamilton, a small, but spirited, discussion emerged about the relationship between Blackness
and the institution of criminal sentencing.302Richard F. Devlin and Matthew Sherrard argued that
the decision would have a chilling effect on any subsequent cases dealing with social context
evidence, particularly in cases involving Black offenders.303The authors predicted that other
judges in similar cases would be unlikely to act on social context evidence. They asserted that
Hamilton would serve to limit the use of social context in cases of systemic and intersectional
inequality. The decision limits the judicial function (how judges should conduct themselves in
court if there is concern about social context) in cases that require judges to consider the
systemic and background factors of the offender. Moreover, the appeal court’s criticism of the
sentencing judge neglects the fact that the sentencing judge found the authority to raise social
context from the Constitution, Criminal Code, and the common law.
According to the authors, the Court over-emphasizes the particularity of Aboriginal
peoples and ignored the fact that other vulnerable communities also suffer from intersectional
inequality. The authors agreed, however, that the sentencing judge presumed the generic applied
to the specific. Moreover, he failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary link between the
offender’s race, gender, and class and the offence.304The authors’ warning proved prophetic
insofar as Hamilton did result in a chill on future cases raising social context evidence in cases
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where these systemic and background factors were germane in the determination of an
appropriate sentence.305However, the wounds from the past are still raw and visible. In some
regard, we have not experienced a full thaw. To date, only a few cases have considered
Blackness in the sentencing context. A detailed analysis of some of these cases will be provided
below. Unlike Hamilton, this new generation of cases aims to avoid the pitfalls of their
predecessors. For example, painstaking detail is placed on providing an evidentiary nexus
between the condition of Blackness and the offence and the offender’s personal responsibility.
Defence lawyers deploy CIARs/IRCARs as a means of providing an evidence-based assessment
of blameworthiness. It is arguable that defence lawyers have travelled a long distance from
Hamilton.
Section H: Doctrinal Review (Nova Scotian Cases)
R v “X” is the first case to use a CIAR. In that case, X, a sixteen (16) year old Black
youth shot his fifteen (15) year old cousin in the stomach with a hunting rifle in an attempt to kill
him. He was convicted of attempted murder. The Crown applied to have X sentenced as an adult.
Defence counsel argued that X should be sentenced as a young person pursuant to subsection
42(2) (o) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.306Defence counsel also invited the court to consider
X’s race and culture in determining the appropriate sentence. This is not the first case where a
court had been invited to consider the impact of race and culture in the sentencing of Black
offenders.307It was, however, the first time that a Canadian court was invited to consider race and
culture in the context of a Black youth offender in determining the appropriateness of imposing
an adult sentence. Defence counsel applied to have Mr. Robert Wright, a registered social
305
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worker, qualified as an expert on race and culture. Following a lengthy voir dire, Judge Anne S.
Derrick (as she then was) qualified Mr. Wright as an expert and permitted him to provide expert
testimony about race and culture, specifically how these factors impacted on X’s life. Judge
Derrick found that Mr. Wright’s testimony and report provided her with:
a more textured, multi-dimensional framework for understanding X, his background and
his behaviours. “X” has been both a perpetrator and a victim of violence in the context of
his criminally-impacted community. Mr. Wright’s evidence gives me a lens through
which to view “X” in determining this application. And it suggests that “X”‘s character
and maturity are still in a formative stage. Mr. Wright encountered a significantly
conflicted young person, still located in his loving, pro-social family, who is struggling
with his identity in the context of a criminally-impacted community that has incubated
mistrust, rivalries, and violence.308

Judge Derrick rejected the Crown’s application and sentenced X to a youth sentence pursuant to
the applicable subsection of the YCJA. She emphasized X’s “immaturity, heightened
vulnerability and reduced capacity for moral judgement.”309She also reasoned that an adult
sentence would derail X’s life and “undermine the potential for him to change.”310Judge Derrick
also canvassed some of the work done by the Correctional Investigator on the status of racialized
offenders in the Federal prison system. She found that the Federal system did not provide
adequate opportunities for racialized offenders to participate in culturally relevant
programming.311This was an essential feature of X’s rehabilitative plan that could not be
facilitated in the Federal system. These programs, however, were available in the youth
correction institution in Nova Scotia.312 Judge Derrick ultimately sentenced X to a three (3) year
Custody and Supervision Order (CSO).
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In the sentencing cases of R v E. S.313, R v R.D. 314 and R v D.B.315, the three-youth coaccused pleaded guilty to an armed home invasion robbery, which resulted in three young people
being shot. One of the victims was rendered a quadriplegic. Interestingly, R.D. was X’s victim.
He was shot by X a year and a half before he participated in the armed home invasion robbery.
The Crown did not seek an adult sentence given that none of the co-accused was the shooter and
their respective degrees of participation. In each case Judge Derrick was invited to consider the
Blackness and Indigeneity of the co-accused. Each of the co-accused, while being raised in Black
communities and families, claimed Aboriginal heritage. Gladue reports were ordered in each
case. However, the reports were unable to conclude with certainty the authenticity of R.D. and
D.B.’s claim of Aboriginal heritage. Judge Derrick was also invited to consider the co-accused
Blackness. Her Honour held as she did in R v X, that race and culture are relevant considerations
in sentencing. Each of the co-accused benefited from the presumption of diminished culpability
by virtue of their youth. The systemic and background factors that have affected the lives of the
co-accused does not diminish their level of accountability. Judge Derrick explained that “the
emphasis on accountability is not diminished by considerations of D.(R.)’s experience as a
racialized youth drawn into the orbit of criminally-inclined peers. It is informed by this
reality”.316She further explained that R.D.’s:
moral culpability and his rehabilitation and reintegration must be examined through the
lens of his racialization and his experiences as a member of a community where criminal
activity has been, to some extent, normalized for him. The normalization of criminal
activity and association was heightened by D.(R.)’s experience as a victim of violence in
his community.317
honour, Judge Derrick (as she then was) said it was in the public’s interest to grant the Director’s Application to
have the offender transferred to adult facility to his finish youth sentence.
313
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Judge Derrick sentenced R.D. to 260 days CSO and 12 months’ probation. She sentenced both
co-accused to 267 days CSO and 12 months’ probation.
In R v N.W.318 the youth offender was tried and convicted of first-degree murder in the
shooting death of another young person. N.W. was seventeen years old at the time of the murder.
The Crown applied to have N.W. sentenced as an adult. Similar to the reasoning in X, Judge
Buckle held that “young people are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral
blameworthiness because of their age, which results in a heightened vulnerability, less maturity,
and reduced capacity for moral judgment.”319She further added that “evidence of race and culture
was relevant to the determination of whether the presumption of diminished moral
blameworthiness or culpability had been rebutted.”320However, Judge Buckle held that
“concluding that race and culture are relevant doesn’t answer the question of how to use that
information in deciding whether to impose an adult sentence.”321She questioned whether this
information should arbitrarily diminish a Black offender’s moral culpability. Her honour relied
on Justice Lebel’s reasoning on this subject, albeit made in the context of indigeneity, and held
that an offender’s “moral culpability is potentially diminished because of the “constrained
circumstances” which they may have found themselves in because of the operation of systemic
and background factors that are connected to their race and cultural background”. 322She
ultimately dismissed the Crown’s application and sentenced N.W. to a youth sentence.
The above cases dealt with youth offenders, who not only benefit from the presumption
of diminished moral blameworthiness but are also sentenced differently than their similarly
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situated adult counterparts. The case of R v. Gabriel323involved an adult offender. The facts of
the case are eerily similar to the youth cases discussed above and those that will follow. The
offender, Kale Gabriel, was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury in the shooting death of
his cousin, Ryan White. He was 22 years old when he killed Ryan. Pursuant to section 235 of the
Criminal Code he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. The only issue that remained to be
determined by the court was the period of parole ineligibility.324Defence counsel asked the court
to consider both a CIAR and Gladue report given Kyle’s mixed Black and Aboriginal
heritage.325Justice Campbell explained that:
Aboriginal offenders are treated differently. The Cultural Assessment in this case does
not have the same constitutional implications as a Gladue report. But that doesn’t mean it
isn’t vitally important. It is a historical fact and present reality that African Nova Scotians
were and continue to be discriminated against. As the criminal justice system must take
into account the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in custody, it must also take into
account the effects of discrimination on members of the African Nova Scotian
community.326

He further added that the CIAR, similar to a Gladue report, “does not provide a justification for a
lighter sentence. Like a Gladue report it might prompt the consideration of restorative justice
options where those are appropriate. It doesn’t position the offender as helpless victim of
historical circumstances.”327After a review of the applicable case law, Justice Campbell set the
period of parole ineligibility at thirteen (13) years.

2017 NSSC 90 (CanLII) (“Gabriel”). See also R v Riley, 2019 NSSC 92. Here, the offender was convicted of 2 nd
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In R v Downey the offender, Devon Downey, pled guilty to manslaughter for punching
the victim, Kaylin Diggs rendering him unconscious, which caused Kaylin to fall and fatally hit
his head on the ground. Devon, who was 25 years old at the time of the offence, had no criminal
record and was leading a pro-social life. He was not a good student but only managed to
complete grade 11. However, Devon benefitted from having community mentors and a stable
home life. He is also the father of two young children. The fight that led to the death of Kaylin
began as brawl in the downtown entertainment district. Kaylin was not the aggressor. He
intervened to assist his friend and was punched by Devon and hit the ground and died. Defence
counsel asked the court to consider Devon’s race and culture in determining an appropriate
sentence. In the CIAR, the writer discussed the cultural code of young Black men in Halifax.
This cultural code involved “resolving social injustice by not leaving, backing down or being
punked out, being unconsciously hyper-vigilant to potential conflicts.”328Justice Rosinski held
that:
in the circumstances of this case, there was no social injustice trigger; no racial or
discriminatory [black versus white] trigger evident; no realistic need to be hyper-vigilant,
given that I have concluded that Mr. Downey was in the company Michael Chisholm who
was fighting Cody Good, surrounded by 8 to 10 of their friends, when Mr. Diggs, an
African-Nova Scotian male of similar age, arrived at the fight to assess his friend Cody
Good’s situation. None of the foregoing factors could realistically be said to play any role
in Mr. Downey’s striking Mr. Diggs.329

The Crown argued for a seven (7) year prison sentence. While the defence argued for a sentence
of two (2) to three (3) year sentence. Justice Rosinski sentenced Devon to four (4) years
imprisonment. However, he endorsed the warrant of committal to ensure that Correctional
Services Canada considered Devon for “psychotherapy and psycho-educational programming; as
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well as programming regarding Mr. Downey’s mental health, particularly by assessors who are
sensitive to his cultural and racial background as an African-Nova Scotian.”330
Section I: Doctrinal Review (Ontario Cases)
As discussed above, scholars warned of the impact that Hamilton would have on the
adducing of social context evidence in sentencing. The prediction proved to be accurate, given
that lawyers have only recently begun to raise in sentencing hearings the social and cultural
context of their Black clients. Unlike Nova Scotia, IRCARs have not been widely used in
Ontario. Of the reported cases, only three (3) decisions benefitted from the use of an IRCAR.331
The other cases, except for R v Reid, referred to or relied on, Jackson332, which was the first case
in Ontario to consider an IRCA report.
In Jackson, Justice Nakatsuru, focused on the accused, Jamaal Jackson’s, Blackness, and
how that fact should inform his sentence. Justice Nakatsuru began his judgement by
acknowledging that African Canadians are overrepresented in jails and decided to use the
opportunity to make “small step in changing that.”333He did warn, however, that sentencing is an
individualized process that is designed to achieve proportionality. Jamaal is of mixed Black and
Aboriginal heritage. However, he identifies as being Black. He is originally from Nova Scotia.
At the time of sentencing hearing he was 33 years old. Jamaal has a lengthy criminal record. The
police intercepted communication between Jamaal and another person making arrangements to
purchase a firearm. A warrant was sought and authorized. The Police went to Jamaal’s home and
searched him incident to arrest and discovered a gun with one bullet in the chamber. At the time,
330
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Jamaal was subject to five weapons prohibitions. He pled guilty to the offences. Justice
Nakatsuru relied on both the IRCA report and his own judicial notice of systemic racism and
other factors that plague African Canadians.334The crown sought an 8.5-10-year sentence, while
the defence sought a 4-year sentence. He was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.
In Jackson, Justice Nakatsuru provided a framework for sentencing Black offenders in
Ontario.335He rejected the defence’s invitation to formulate a sentencing methodology similar to
the one used for Indigenous offenders. Instead, he grounded his methodology in the sentencing
principles already enshrined in the Criminal Code. Moreover, he also rejected the notion that
expert evidence is mandatory, whether in the form of an IRCA report or viva voce evidence from
a ‘race and culture’ expert. The court found that judicial notice of the conditions facing Black
people across Canada and how those conditions may impact the offender before the court is
sufficient. However, it was held that the accused need not establish a direct link between antiBlack racism/background factors and the crime.336 Justice Lemay rejected this holding in R v
Brissett and Francis. In that case, the court found that the ruling in Hamilton required some
direct link between the social deprivation and the crime or the offender.337 In R v Williams,
Justice Hill explained that the:
court’s dicta in Hamilton is best understood to mean that the record before the court ought
to raise this issue from the general to the specific in the sense of some evidence, direct or
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inferential, that racial disadvantage is linked to constraint of a particular offender’s
choices and to his life experience in bringing him before the court.338

In Morris, Nakatsuru J., relying largely on his analysis in Jackson, sentenced the accused to a 15month sentence for gun possession. That sentence was lowered to 12 months after the judge
found that the police breached the accused’s Charter rights during his arrest when the police
officer drove the police car over the accused’s foot. Like Jackson, the court took judicial notice
of systemic anti-Black racism and relied heavily on the IRCA report filed by the accused. The
court found that the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on the accused should mitigate the
sentence imposed. He also characterized the sentenced as “lenient” and added that some people
might consider the accused as an unworthy candidate for such a low sentence. The judge
commented that the accused’s decision to pick up a gun was a consequence of oppression,
despair and disadvantage.339
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Chapter Four: Mobilizing Blackness During Sentencing
Section A: The Paradox of Visibility
In all the cases reviewed above, the offenders sought to have the sentencing judge focus
on their Blackness. Some legal scholars, particularly Tanovich, hypothesize that anti-Blackness
in the criminal justice system can be remedied by increasing the visibility of Blackness/race. 340It
is posited that the erasure of race perpetuates racism by blocking opportunities for meaningful
engagement with race-based claims. There is, perhaps, cogent reasons to suggest that by
highlighting race, judges will be provided with a fulsome understanding of the salient issues in
dispute. Indeed, race talk may encourage a judge to grapple with issues that are often deemed
taboo, or within the province of social scientists and legislators. It may also inspire judicial
examination of identity and, perhaps more importantly, a reckoning of how a particular judge has
previously analyzed race. Judges are not immune to common suppositions about race, culture
and belonging.341A judicial appointment does not automatically ‘wipe’ entrenched notions,
attitudes and behaviours. Such an expectation would be unreasonable and naive. What is instead
required is adherence to and respect for the law and prevailing standards of decency. However,
like laypeople, judges may, at times, whether consciously or unconsciously access and rely on
entrenched suppositions.342This kind of autonomic thinking is rampant in the policing of Black
bodies.343
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In the case of judges, it may be challenging to detect whether racism motivated their
decision. While judges are held to a high standard of fairness, it is unreasonable to believe that
they are not similarly laden with pernicious racial presuppositions. It is, however, impermissible
for them to rely on these suppositions in their decision-making. In order to avoid claims of bias,
Judges must strive for impartiality and aim to disabuse themselves of such notions. It is
questionable whether judges are capable of thoroughly disabusing themselves of these
suppositions. Is it possible, however, that a bombardment of race talk may inadvertently trigger a
judge’s deeply held preconceived notions about Blackness? One may argue that these beliefs and
experiences may provide a lens through which a judge can analyze a problematic issue. The
problem arises, however, when these experiences, and beliefs are given precedence over the
evidence tendered by the parties to the dispute, or if they lead to a reasonable apprehension of
bias.
In Hamilton, Justice Hill, frustrated with the conspicuous efforts of lawyers to silence the
issue of race, class and gender in drug importation cases, decided to raise the issue himself. Not
only did he take judicial notice of this phenomenon, he also conducted extensive research and
adduced his findings into evidence. Hamilton provides an excellent example of a judicial overcorrection of the over-punishment of Black female bodies.344Justice Hill endeavoured sought to
increase the visibility of a phenomenon that he considered to be a severe problem in Black
communities. He essentially turned Ms. Hamilton’s sentencing hearing into platform from where
race talk, particularly around race, gender and class, could take flight. As noted above, this
decision was met with swift rebuke from the Court of Appeal. Justice Hill may be credited,
however, for highlighting a grave issue in some Black communities, namely drug trafficking,
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and, more importantly, the state’s response to it.345However, his laudable approach may have had
unintentional consequences insofar as it may have reinforced stereotypes around Blackness and
the drug trade. A similar argument can be made about the reported CIARs/IRCARs cases in that
they primarily mobilize race in situations involving serious gun and drug violence. To date, there
are no reported IRCAR/CIAR cases that mobilize race in the context of a less serious crime.
Admittedly, it would be deemed unreasonable to presuppose that Blackness is not an essential
factor in sentencing cases involving theft, impaired driving, or other offences not typically
associated with Black people. It is disturbing that Blackness is primarily being raised in the
context of serious and violent crimes where both the victim and the offender are Black
Canadians.
Moreover, because Blackness is stereotypically associated with gun and drug crimes,
defence lawyers must be careful that this association does not inadvertently get reinforced
through a practice of using CIARs/IRCARS in primarily gun and drug cases. In these cases,
judges are provided with a biographical sketch of the offender’s journey through Blackness.
Defence lawyers invite judges to draw connections between the offender’s journey and his
unfortunate destination. These reports are deployed as a means of connecting the offender’s
Blackness and the offence, which is done in order to conduct a better assessment of moral
blameworthiness. In some sense, Blackness is coopted and used as a yardstick to measure blame.
The more egregious the Black experience, the less morally blameworthy is the offender for his
crime. Therefore, formulating a wretched Black experience may be instrumental in securing a
positive sentencing outcome. This approach may require an offender to perform a certain type of
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Blackness. One that is tragic and pathological but may increase the chances of diminishing moral
blameworthiness.
Consequently, the most wretched embodiment of Blackness is put on display in order to
evoke a particular emotive response from a sentencing judge. The more pitiful the narrative, the
higher the probability of a favourable outcome. Thus, all attempts at erasing race are countered
by over-emphasizing the salience of race. The Blackness of the offender must become
undeniably visible, which will presumably force judicial engagement. It is unclear, however, that
increased judicial engagement with race will reduce the over-incarceration of Black Canadians.
Indeed, as it is colloquially stated: talk may be cheap. Without concrete action, for example,
judicial willingness to incorporate, as Steiker puts it, robust mercy, as a countervailing method of
correcting the impulse to over-punish, visibility may be rendered hollow.346In some sense,
performing Blackness as a means of mitigating punishment involves self-degradation.347
However, it is controversial if mercy and justice can co-exist in a retributive sentencing
paradigm.348Perhaps even more controversial is whether mercy and Blackness can co-exist.
It is unclear whether the goal of CIARs/IRCARs is to generate proportionate sentences
or disproportionately low sentences that promote countervailing goals. Put another way, can
IRCARs/CIARs be construed as a plea for mercy? Moreover, if so, is this a dignifying aim given
that some Black offenders desire colour-blind treatment by sentencing judges. One might even
argue that the whole purpose of CIARs/IRCARs is to ask judges to focus on the colour of the
accused’s skin so that they will focus on the content of the accused’s character. This approach is
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challenging, and maybe even paradoxical manoeuvre – but it may also be a logical one, insofar
as we are operating within the cruel illogic of white supremacy.349
In a proportionality-based sentencing regime, punishment is allocated in correspondence
with desert/blame.350Thus, any attempts at sentence mitigation must demonstrate how the
offender’s degree of blame can be attenuated. Given the supposed pathologies associated with
Blackness, the offender’s race may provide the perfect scapegoat. It is not the offender, per se,
that deserves blame – but rather his Blackness. He, therefore, cannot be held solely responsible
for his conduct, because but for his miserable experiences, he would not have chosen that
particular path. In other words, his choices were constrained by a society infected with antiBlack racism. Thus, society deserves some, if not most, of the blame. It follows that a
proportionate sentence must apportion blame in a fashion that compensates the offender for the
structural violence levelled against him. A Black offender embodies the status of both victim and
offender.351Therefore, he must not be made to pay for conduct that was the inexorable result of
his attempts at surviving a structurally racist society. This supposition poses a problem, however,
namely: how does one measure the amount of the offender’s conduct that was motivated by freewill and the amount that was the consequence of structural violence? There is no accepted
scientific method used in criminal sentencing to parse blame.352The proportionality analysis is
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relied upon to perform that function. There are two points on the proportionality scale –
seriousness of the offence and the offender’s level of moral blameworthiness. With regard to the
former, as highlighted above, many of the IRCAR/CIAR cases involved serious and violent
offences. Thus, it is the latter point of the scale that is often in contention.
Human beings are the product of many competing and incongruent forces. Therefore,
there is serious doubt around the feasibility of a linear theory of criminality. 353Unfortunately,
Blackness is often unfairly proffered as an arrow to criminality. While there exist, no scientific
studies evincing such a connection, there is nonetheless a prevailing pseudo-scientific notion that
Black bodies are prone to criminality. Proponents of IRCARs/CIARs may run the risk of
reinforcing this belief when Blackness is routinely offered as an excuse or an explanation for an
offender’s conduct. Such an approach sacrifices Blackness for sentencing expediency. The
concern is that a particular type of Blackness: one that is tragic and pathological - is provided as
the lens through which to analyze an offender’s conduct. There are cogent reasons to suggest that
this approach may actually reinforce already entrenched notions of Black criminality. Many of
the ex-offenders interviewed for this project were opposed to the idea of offering race as an
explanation for their conduct. One ex-offender interviewee remarked that “if I did the crime, then
my race shouldn’t matter.”354Many of the ex-offenders desired to be treated similar to white
offenders. It appeared that whiteness in their eyes was a barometer for fair treatment. In some
sense, they desired to have their race remain neutral – invisible.355This quest for invisibility,
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however, may be futile. It is also problematic to imagine that equality may only be achieved
when race is rendered invisible. This is the paradox confronting critical race lawyers and
scholars, namely: when is it appropriate or desirable to make race visible? In the eyes of the exoffenders, the answer is obvious – they did not see value in making their race visible. Indeed,
they perceived their race as being an obstacle to fair treatment. The ex-offenders expressed a
concern that Franz Fanon aptly explained in his book, Back Skins White Masks:
and already I am being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am fixed. Having
adjusted their microtomes, they objectively cut away slices of my reality. I am laid bare. I
feel, I see in those white faces that it is not a new man who has come in, but a new kind of
man, a new genus. Why, it's a Negro!
I slip into corners, I remain silent, I strive for anonymity, for invisibility. Look, I will
accept the lot, as long as no one notices me.
My blackness was there, dark and unarguable. And it tormented me, pursued me,
disturbed me, angered me. Negroes are savages, brutes, illiterates.356

Fanon’s explication of Blackness lends support to the ex-offenders’ apprehensions around race
visibility. It can be traumatic for some offenders to witness and participate in, the magnification
of their Blackness in a courtroom setting, where they are already viscerally aware of their
Blackness, and of the fact that Blackness typically operates against people’s favour in our courts
and society.357Blackness is always present. It, however, becomes more prominent in the sight of
whiteness. In those moments, Blackness is transformed – mutated into something, that despite
being unrecognizable to most Black Canadians, nonetheless demands recognition. The Black
body becomes of a site of constant reconfiguration in both meaning and identity. It is contorted
at a whim to ever-changing demands on Black identity. Indeed, to exist in Black skin is a
about his individuality and character is obscured and rendered invisible by virtue of his skin. He writes, “I am
invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus
sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they
see only my surroundings, themselves or figments of their imagination, indeed, everything and anything except me.”
On this reading, Black people who want to be treated as white do not want to be invisible; they want to be visible in
the way that white people are – as persons in our society who are seen as individuals, and not as cyphers or
placeholders onto which we project a standardized set of characteristics.
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continuous struggle between the desire for free expression and predestination. As Fanon
explains:
when the black man, who has never felt as much a "Negro" as he has under white
domination, decides to prove his culture and act as a cultivated person, he realizes that
history imposes on him a terrain already mapped out, that history sets him along a very
precise path and that he is expected to demonstrate the existence of a "Negro" culture.358

What Fanon describes can only be understood as an affront to the dignity and free will of Black
peoples. Black Canadians’ free will is constrained through the mechanism of anti-Black racism
and other forms of structural violence. They inhabit foreign bodies that are not of their creation.
Black bodies are, in one sense, alien but have nevertheless managed to replace and suppress the
Black aesthetic of another time, or that exist in the minds and souls of Black peoples. This
constructed “Blackness” provides the only visible, tangible representation of Blackness. What
resides inside the mind and soul of Black peoples is deemed fictional or worse, valueless, which
may lend support for the ex-offenders’ reluctance to engage with their Blackness during
sentencing. The Blackness on display is not their own, but despite its origins, they are viscerally
aware that it is this image of Blackness that has been engrafted on them. It is now their burden to
bear.
W.E.B Du Bois posited that Black people embody a sort of double-consciousness. He
remarked that:
after the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this
American world, -- a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him
see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt
and pity. One ever feels his twoness, -- an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts,
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength
alone keeps it from being torn asunder.359
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Du Bois exposition of double-consciousness is as accurate today as it was when he wrote it.
Black offenders who come before white sentencing judges must attend to both these realities.
Their self-perception is arguably given value through the eyes of another. Therefore, it may be
prudent to obscure the gaze of the judge by focusing the judge’s attention away from
Blackness.360IRCARs/CIARs do the opposite. They purposely place Blackness in the judge’s
direct line of sight to encourage him or her to examine issues of identity and race and their
relevance in criminal sentencing. This approach is not without risk. As Razack argues:
unlikely to acknowledge their oppressive practices, dominant groups merely deny that
such practices exist. To insist on being seen, that is, to contest the dominant group's
perception is - for an oppressed person -to be smashed in the process by a wall of denial
that makes of one's existence an illusion, an imagined story of unfairness and injustice.361

Indeed, there exists a sort of paradox inherent within the visibility-invisibility dichotomy. To
desire acknowledgement is to risk denial, derision and unfair treatment, whereas invisibility
serves to perpetuate injustice. Proponents of sentencing reform via IRCARs/CIARs presuppose
that the principle of judicial impartiality will provide a shield against the sting of anti-Blackness.
One lawyer interviewed for this project stated that “lawyers have this blind faith in the system.
The offenders have no faith in the system. They must feel that their Blackness put them in this
situation then why would they want to highlight it.”362 Her opinion seems to align with the exoffenders’ perception around introducing race in sentencing. It is unclear if defence lawyers are
aware of this reluctance. One defence lawyer even remarked that he must work a lot harder for
his Black clients; therefore, he welcomes any tool that will make this job easier.363 It is
questionably if IRCARs/CIARs can make the job of defence lawyers easier. Put another way,

360

Sherene Razack, supra note 346 at 24.
Ibid.
362
J.T. is a white female lawyer. This is a direct quote.
363
G.C. is a Black male defence lawyer.
361

91

does emphasizing race serve to make race-based litigation or sentencing easier or fairer? There is
reason to suspect that an inordinate amount of attention on race may ‘back-fire’ and produce
unanticipated results. Does this mean, however, that race should be sidelined in sentencing
hearings given the inherent risks associated with its mobilization? This question will be
discussed in more detail below. However, suffice it to say, if race is mobilized at sentencing,
then it should be done in a principled fashion in light of this approach’s pitfalls and promises.
When race is coopted as a convenient way to explain a phenomenon, or proffered as the sole unit
for legal analysis, we risk essentializing the Black experience. These same questions and issues
play out when lawyers consider spotlighting race in the context of Charter challenges.
Section B: The Paradox of Invisibility (Race and the Charter)
The paradox of visibility has played out in other contexts, apart from sentencing – most
notably in the framing of Charter challenges.364Defence lawyers rarely mobilize race in cases
dealing with anti-Black policing.365This approach is problematic because a failure to cite race
and anti-Black bias during the guilt phase, including via Charter challenges and in evidence voir
dires, leaves anti-Black racism to be dealt with on the back end. 366It is widely accepted that the
overcriminalization of Black Canadians leads to disparity in Black incarceration rates. Despite
this recognition, anti-Black policing practices, for instance carding, pretext stops, overcharging,
unreasonable searches, and arbitrary detentions, continue to result in a high number of
prosecutions.367It is, however, rarely the case that defence counsel will challenge the police’s
misconduct, and if challenged it is rarely accepted by the court. Despite the reluctance from the
criminal bar and the Bench, Professor Tanovich has been calling for years for courts and lawyers
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to recognize the importance of mobilizing race in criminal litigation.368However, there have been
some notable successes, most recently in Le. Le is a departure from previous jurisprudence that
has avoided looking race in the eye and has maintained what Tanovich describes as the
“whiteness of the Charter.”369
In Le, the police unlawfully detained and carded five racialized young men, four Black
and one Asian, in the backyard of a housing unit in a low–income area of Toronto. The Asian
male ran when he asked about the contents of a bag he was carrying and was chased by the
police. When he was apprehended and subsequently searched, the police discovered a loaded
handgun, drugs and money in the bag. The accused was convicted at trial. His conviction was
upheld on appeal. The matter proceeded to the Supreme Court of Canada. A majority of the
Court overturned the conviction and entered acquittals. Writing for the majority in a 3-2 split,
Martin and Brown JJ. held that the police arbitrarily detained the applicant in breach of his
section 9 Charter right. The majority excluded the evidence under subsection 24 (2) of the
Charter as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The majority
found that the accused was detained from the moment the police officers entered the backyard.
The majority’s section 9 analysis focused on how those individuals’ lived experiences as
racialized men would inform their experience of police interactions, and must, therefore, be
central to the detention analysis.370They also emphasized the importance of incorporating race in
the detention analysis, particularly given the rise of carding and other racially biased policing
strategies.371
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Le provides critical race lawyers, concerned with combating anti-Black policing, with an
opportunity and a guide to the appropriate mobilization of Blackness/race under section 9 of the
Charter. Race is no longer to be rendered silent or marginalized when making a claim of
arbitrary detention or unlawful arrest by law enforcement; indeed, if race is implicated, it is to be
made a central part of the detention analysis. Le represents a subtle but significant shift in the
Court’s detention analysis. Arguably, the Court incorporated a more intersectional approach in
the section 9 analysis and in so doing, validated the subjective perspectives of racialized people.
However, while the chill on race talk within the section 9 framework is now partially thawed,
defence lawyers must avoid mobilizing race simply because the Court has given its blessing. The
concern is that the uncoordinated and unprincipled use of Le may yield unintended results, for
instance, indictments for playing the so-called “race card,”372which may ultimately serve to
water down the precedential efficacy of the decision. However, if deployed conscientiously but
unapologetically, the reasoning in Le has the potential to advance racial equality in Canada. The
foregoing begs the question: will the Le majority’s lifting of the judicial embargo on race-based
Charter litigation have any impact on how judges address race in sentencing? It is not being
suggested that the Court’s acknowledgment of the role that race plays in the detention analysis is
analogous to how race should be deployed in sentencing. For example, outside of the sentencing
arena, a successful race-based argument may lead to the exclusion of evidence, removal of
biased jurors, striking down offensive legislation and even Charter damages. What is the
remedial value, however, in expounding and mobilizing Blackness at a sentencing hearing?
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Section C: Achieving Sentencing Reform with IRCARs/CIARS (Potential and Pitfalls)
A pitfall of mobilizing race at sentencing via IRCARs/CIARs is the possibility that such
an approach may diminish the social and political realities of Blackness. For example, Blackness
may be disembodied from how it is socially and politically produced, which can compound
existing structural violence. Blackness is a “product of social thought and relations. Not
objective, inherent, or fixed, they correspond to no biological or genetic reality: rather, races are
categories that society invents, manipulates, or retires when convenient”.373There is a concern
that the narratives that are highlighted in IRCARs/CIARs may inadvertently pathologize
Blackness. By emphasizing the traumatic ways in which Blackness impacts Black Canadians,
and offenders, in particular, may serve to convert IRCARs/CIARS into a pseudo-mental health
style report.374Such a report may provide credence to outmoded notions of Black peoples’
dangerous dispositions and mental fragility. As Anthony Peterson aptly remarked: “any mention
of race will necessarily involve heroes and villains, angels and demons, winners and losers.”375
Race talk is value-laden. While “race is not real, it matters."376
There is a general resistance by judges to permit any explicit discussion of race during
the criminal process, both at the guilt phase and at sentencing. What does this mean for lawyers
who seek to mobilize race at sentencing? In one sense, defence lawyers who seek to use
IRCARs/CIARs to explicitly discuss race at the sentencing phase are presenting race in a
formulaic fashion at a late stage of the proceedings, oftentimes after eliding race talk throughout
the trial phase. Such an approach may result in an over-exaggeration of race as a means of
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correcting or to compensate for its erasure at other junctures. However, as it has been expressly
recognized in the Gladue context that sentencing cannot be a panacea for Indigenous
overrepresentation377, the same is correct for Black overrepresentation.378It is unlikely that
systemic anti-Black racism will be eliminated by focusing exclusively on sentencing. However,
to the extent that sentencing can be part of the solution, it raises the aforementioned paradox –
does focusing on Blackness promote more merciful/proportionate sentences? Alternatively, does
it pose the risk of backfiring insofar as it may increase the judge’s sense of the offender’s
dangerousness, irretrievability, etc.? Moreover, will it irritate judges and the public, who may
resist the implication that they are biased or accuse lawyers and offenders of “playing the race
card”?
Section D: Blackness and Criminal Sentencing (Unlikely Counterparts)
When Blackness is mobilized as a potential mitigating factor, can it lead a more
proportionate sentence? Moreover, if it can, how does it accomplish this task? To truly ‘know’
Blackness requires taking a journey through the Black experience, which may necessitate the
temporary suspension of privilege. Can this journey be facilitated and guided with an
IRCA/CIAR or through judicial notice? Alternatively, does it require a communitarian approach
that compels the offender to embrace the impact of his crime on the integrity of the
community?379For example, the Black community could demonstrate to the judge, the offender
and the broader public, how the offender’s actions further complicated the already complicated
journey that is Blackness. On this account, an IRCAR/CIAR should provide the judge with a
map to guide him/her along their journey through Blackness. It could help him/her avoid certain
377
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stereotypical pitfalls or, worse, determinism. The journey may provide the judge with a link
between Blackness as a general experience, and how Blackness acted upon the specific offender.
Blackness is dynamic and thus, no two African Canadians necessarily experience it in the
same manner, which presents a challenge when there is an over-reliance on IRCARs/CIARS.
These reports may inadvertently package the Black experience and thereby reduce it to a
monolithic experience that is experienced similarly by all Black Canadians. A judge may be led
to believe that a Jamaican born offender experiences Blackness similar to his Ghanaian
counterpart. For example, while:
Toronto’s youth violence wears the face of the Black youth as the primary target of
racism…..just below the surface of this generic Black youth sits the Jamaicanization of
crime. The discourse about the generic Black criminal in effect points to the Jamaican as
the criminal. Likewise, other studies contest the homogenization of Blacks, highlighting
how each Black group experiences and responds to violence differently. As we witness
the shift from the Jamaicanization to Africanization of crime, we realize that anti-AfricanBlack racism is also a space marked by heterogeneity. Each African group experiences it
differently. The newest face is the Somalization of crime.380

There do exist certain common realities that are experienced by all Black Canadians, despite
their cultural or geographic differences. For example, anti-Black racial profiling by the police is
conducted with little concern about whether the suspect is Ghanaian or Jamaican. It is the
offender’s skin colour that attracts unwanted scrutiny. However, at the Borders, this may not be
the case. A Jamaican passenger may attract secondary inspection due to the prevailing stereotype
that Jamaicans, particularly Black Jamaican females, are suspected drug mules. 381Thus,
IRCAR/CIAR writers must be mindful that they do not essentialize the experiences of Black
peoples through the presentation of a solitary Black narrative that may be alien to large sections
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of the Black community.382In some cases, pervasive myths and attitudes about Blackness may
serve to override the information contained in a CIARS/IRCARS, which is due in part to the fact
that the criminal justice system is not race-neutral or colour blind.
Moreover, to the extent that we are talking about reforms centred on the use of
IRCARs/CIARs, we must acknowledge that this approach is not a “no-cost” or “low-cost”
proposition for the individuals and communities they seek to benefit. Arguably, their production
is potentially (re)traumatizing. The narratives, in the CIARs/IRCARs reviewed for this project,
are not exclusive to the offenders, adducing them in to evidence before sentencing courts. It is a
collective narrative that uses, and interpretation will reverberate outside of the courtroom.
Blackness is often manipulated by both lawyers and clients to get the best sentence outcome
possible. One defence lawyer even remarked that “my goal is to use these reports to get the best
deal for my client.”383Another lawyer stated that “given the judicial resistance to talking about
race we must infuse the system with a sense that these are issue that must be grappled
with.”384As discussed above, the concept of Blackness is malleable and is prone to distortion.
The picture of Blackness that is sometimes presented to sentencing judges via IRCARs/CIARs
often aligns with many of the pernicious stereotypes that socially disadvantage Black Canadians.
Thus, if used in an unprincipled fashion, these reports may solidify prevailing presuppositions
about Blackness. It is questionable if a slight numerical reduction in an offender’s sentence is
worth the social impact this kind of strategy will have on Black communities.
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Like Gladue reports, IRCARs/CIARs seek to contextualize blameworthiness insofar as
IRCAR/CIAR writers must paint a portrait of Blackness and its connections to the offence and
the offender. However, within this portrait are the images of countless individuals that are caught
in the same orbit as the offender – thus, their lives are also the subject, albeit inadvertently, of
review. An analysis of the offender becomes an analysis of the entire group. For example, even
though Blackness does not affect all Black people equally when Blackness is essentialized for
judicial convenience, the portrait purports to tell the story of an entire race. This approach can
have detrimental consequences for the broader Black community that assiduously toil to sever
the linkages between Blackness and crime. The offender’s Black experience is informed by
various forces that have resulted in his or her offending behaviour. It is not merely a reaction to
the oppression that Black people experience in common, i.e. racial profiling, carding, streaming.
There is, arguably, no linear or causal trajectory between anti-Black racism/Blackness and
criminality. Such a theory is a limited and intellectually lazy way of understanding the impacts of
anti-Blackness.
IRCARs/CIARS are designed to erect an evidentiary causeway to link the background or
systemic factors pertinent to the offender and the offence. These reports require an offender to
disclose information about the many ways in which he has experience structural violence. These
stories are traumatic and may serve to re-traumatize the individual. Thus, the writing, collection
and dissemination of the information in these reports must be trauma-informed. The offender is
made to detail how his Blackness informed and constrained his choices. A positive
acknowledgment may provide a cathartic relief – a sense of validation and vindication, whereas
an adverse treatment may compound the layers of mistrust and antipathy that many Black
Canadians have towards the criminal justice system. Therefore, sentencing reform - and
99

especially sentencing reform involving the use of IRCARs/CIARs - can only be justified if its
positive material impacts on Black communities and individuals outweigh its costs. Furthermore,
the question of whether sentencing reform (including the expanded use of IRCARs/CIARs) can
have any significant positive material impact is an open one, given the intrinsic conservativeness
of sentencing reform.
In assessing whether sentencing reform (expanded use of IRCARs/CIARs) can have a
sufficiently positive impact to justify its use, despite its costs, it is helpful to think about
sentencing in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The former requires an analysis of sentence
reduction, in terms of time (quantitative), and the corresponding impact that this may have on the
broader Black community. For example, is a slight reduction in time, in the numerical sense,
worth the potential trauma faced by not only the offender but the Black community? The
IRCAR/CIAR sentencing decisions reviewed for this thesis, except for Morris, revealed that the
numerical reduction in sentences was negligible and tended to fit within existing sentencing
ranges. Moreover, in those cases where the sentence was fixed by law, the parole ineligibility
period was generally a judicial attempt at “splitting the difference” between the defence and
Crown’s request. The problem is not the with the efficacy of IRCARs/CIARs per se, rather the
fact that they are designed to work within the paradigm of proportionality, and a system that
measures punishment severity in quantitative terms. The impact of these reports in youth cases is
are more potent. In all cases, the sentencing judge refused the Crown’s application to sentence
the offender as an adult. These results, however, are not solely a consequence of the introduction
of IRCARs/CIARs; instead, they are due to an application of the principle of reduced
blameworthiness that is enshrined in the YCJA. The reports instead provided the judges with rich
background information that assisted them in contextualizing the offender and the offence.
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A qualitative change may relate to restorative justice principles.385It might also
correspond, analogously, with the Gladue approach, which seeks to advance more culturallyappropriate sentencing responses (qualitative) in addition to reducing over-incarceration
(quantitative); though here, one must be mindful about the distinctiveness of Gladue, and the
unique relationship between Indigenous peoples and the State. In particular, a qualitative shift
could place the focus more squarely on rehabilitation and reintegration, and away from a focus
on crime reduction through incapacitation and deterrence. Crucially, such a shift would not
necessarily compromise the goals of crime reduction, which are not well served by the current
system. For instance, there is currently a serious gun and drug problem in some Black
communities across Canada, particularly in Toronto. This problem is not easily remedied as it is
rooted in a long history of structural violence against Black Canadians.386Thus, a theory of
sentencing that supports using a victim of structural racism as a tool for curbing the very
conditions it is instrumental in creating is problematic and reinforces structural violence against
Black Canadians. To manipulate and use the product of anti-Blackness (the offender and his
sentence) to combat the impact of anti-Blackness (the reason why the offender is before the
court) does not prevent crime. In this regard, general deterrence deflects responsibility from the
State to the offender and his community for issues that are not solely their creation. It is unlikely
that IRCARs/CIARs alone can promote a shift away from general deterrence. Arguably, a shift
away from general deterrence would require a more radical change in sentencing policy, as it
would likely require a formal change to the Criminal Code and not just a new interpretation of
the existing statutory provisions.
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From a qualitative standpoint, a sentencing judge must consider whether the offender is
being sentenced in a culturally salient manner. For example, are there relevant cultural
programming at the institution where he will be incarcerated or should the court use communitybased alternatives for sentencing. In the Gladue context, for a sentence to be just, it must
consider the cultural needs of the offender. As Court explained in Gladue:
it is often the case that neither aboriginal offenders nor their communities are well served
by incarcerating offenders, particularly for less serious or non-violent offences. Where
these sanctions are reasonable in the circumstances, they should be implemented. In all
instances, it is appropriate to attempt to craft the sentencing process and the sanctions
imposed in accordance with the aboriginal perspective.387

Similar considerations should be had in the case of Black offenders. The Black experience,
despite its diversity, share one thing in common – oppression. While this oppression is
experienced in different ways, it results in collective trauma. A sentencing decision can either
ameliorate or aggravate that trauma. As Duff argues, the institution of criminal sentencing serves
a communicative function.388A sentence can convey messages of censure or restoration. For
instance, an overly harsh sentence may signal a strong message of censure, whereas a lenient one
may transmit compassion or mercy. Thus, it is critical that judges strongly consider the
communicative and didactic effects of their sentencing decisions.
Black offenders may, however, embody both the role of victim and offender, making it
critical for a sentencing judge to consider what communicative impact the sentence will have on
the offender and his community. There is no reason to believe that Black Canadians do not share
the same retributive impulse as many other non-Black Canadians.389Unlike Indigenous peoples,
there is no evidence to suggest that Black peoples have “different conceptions of criminal justice
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and of appropriate criminal sanctions.”390There are, however, pressing social issues in Black
communities across Canada. Judges should be empowered to take judicial notice of this fact or
other compelling social context evidence, in contextualizing, and in some cases, attenuating
moral blameworthiness.391IRCARs/CIARs can be deployed as a tool for restoring broken social
bonds and also as a means of edifying judges, crowns and defence lawyers about the impact that
criminal sentencing continues to have on Black communities.392A restorative justice approach
may prioritize healing broken social bonds and repairing the diabolic image of Blackness that is
pervasive in Canada. As the Court held in R v Nasogaluak, “a proportionate sentence is one that
expresses, to some extent, society’s legitimate shared values and concerns.”393
Outside of Nova Scotia, IRCARs/CIARs have not attracted sufficient judicial buy-in.
Indeed, the Jackson/Morris methodology has not garnered the widespread support needed to
correct, or at the very least critically redress, the plight facing Black offenders in the criminal
justice system. Given the inherent pitfalls associated with combating anti-Black racism via
sentence reform, it may be sensible to direct the community’s limited political/social/economic
capital on other potential targets. However, sentencing is a site of immense structural violence
and is thereby is an appropriate platform to address anti-Blackness. Bias at the sentencing phase
results in harsher sentences for similarly-situated Black offenders, thereby exacerbating the
problem of over-incarceration. Despite this fact, almost no work has been done on the question
of how we might promote an anti-racist agenda through criminal sentencing. Not simply by
treating Blackness as something that is implicitly or unconsciously, and unjustly, aggravating;
but on explicitly attending to it as a potential mitigating factor. The Jackson/Morris framework
390
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provides a jurisprudential basis, albeit flimsy, for addressing Blackness in the sentencing process
by grounding the Black experience in the proportionality analysis. It does so by examining how
the offender’s experience through Blackness connects to the crime and the offender’s personal
responsibility.
Blackness is complex factor that is often overlooked by judges. It may, however, be
challenging to precisely understand what must be done with Blackness in order to redress or
address structural violence. This issue has recently come to the forefront of race-based Charter
litigation but has received minimal consideration in the sentencing context. It is accepted that
anti-Blackness may result in over-policing, but does it render the offender less culpable? Some
of the Black ex-offenders interviewed for this study, perceived their Blackness as a form of
restraint in how they conduct their daily lives. The IRCAR writer interviewed for this project,
also remarked that Black people’s choices are constrained due to anti-Black racism. When asked
to explain her observation, she commented that “Black people are punished for simply trying to
survive the conditions created by anti-Black racism.”394The decision to engage in criminality is
thus not a voluntary act per se, but rather one that is the by-product of structural racism. In a
sense, a Black offender may embody two positions - victim and offender. He is the victim of a
cruel system that simultaneously shapes and curtail his choices. The Blackness that he
experiences is not of his own construction. He inherited it along with all the consequences that
flow from that condition.395
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Anti-Blackness does not only destroy Black bodies but is instrumental in the wholesale
destruction of communities. Akwasi Owusu-Bempah asserts that:
what little research that exists concerning Black Canadian offenders indicates they are
over-represented among homicide offenders in some urban areas such as Toronto. Survey
data from Toronto indicate Black Canadian youth may be somewhat more involved with
violence such as assaults than other racial groups.396

Indeed, all the cases reviewed for this thesis involved Black men engaged in violent behaviour.
While there is no statistical or biological correlation between Blackness and crime, these cases
may imply otherwise. In some sense, the use of IRCARs/CIARS may lead to a situation where
an offender’s Blackness is highlighted in cases involving crimes that are often associated with
Black criminality. Thus, creating an association that is a contributing factor to the racism that
leads to over-representation and necessitates the use of CIARs/IRCARs in the first place.
However, as mentioned above, in some situations, the offender is also victimized, which
assumes that society ought to bear some of the responsibility for the offender’s actions. Such a
characterization of victimhood may serve to diminish the seriousness of the crime committed and
the justice that the victim and the wider public deserves. In R v “X”, for example, the young
person shot his cousin in the stomach with a hunting rifle. In Gabriel, the offender shot and
killed his cousin. In both cases both the victims and the offenders were Black, and the offence

the colonial project Indigenous peoples are increasingly being disconnected from Ruwe, and thereby themselves.
Watson asserts that her connection to Ruwe was not extinguished by the colonial wave. She declares: “I remain who
I am, beneath the layers of invasion, colonisation and rape”. Nonetheless, despite Watson’s defiant and resistive
declaration she asserts that the “process of colonialism in the end become self-colonising”. She makes that remark in
the context of the conspicuous manner in which the colonial project is being furthered by Indigenous Peoples. The
same can be said in the Canadian context. In her seminal work on sexual violence in Indigenous communities,
Hadley Friedland discusses the high level of sexual crime in Indigenous communities and the existential crisis being
faced by their denizens in how to address these violent issues in a cultural appropriate manner. Black Canadians
similarly struggle with self-enslavement/colonization in their own fight for emancipation. As reggae icon Bob
Marley once remarked “emancipate yourself from mental slavery, for none but ourselves can free our mind”. It is
within the minds and souls of Black peoples that there exist the new frontier of slavery and anti-Black racism. As
Franz Fanon asserted, “it is all too true that the major responsibility for this racialization of thought, or at least the
way it is applied, lies with the Europeans who have never stopped placing white culture in opposition to the other
noncultures.”
396
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involved the violent use of a firearm. The CIARs in both cases provided the respective
sentencing judge with a veritable blizzard of social context and background information about
both offenders. This information may shed light on the circumstances that precipitated the
offence and explicate the moral blameworthiness of the offender. However, and as held in
Ipeelee, this background information should “not operate as an excuse or justification for an
offence.”397It is not being suggested that the intended purpose of IRCARs/CIARs is to provide a
race-based excuse or justification for the offending behaviour of a Black Canadian. Any
approach to sentencing that seeks to package or essentialize Blackness to explain a Black
offender’s actions is fundamentally flawed. Such an approach would be an affront to dignity and
serve to support a deterministic theory of crime.398
There is an issue with highlighting an offender’s Blackness/race in order to prevent unfair
attention to his race/Blackness. As discussed earlier, the criminal justice system is instrumental
in constructing certain ‘truths’ about race and crime, which may unconsciously lead to the
conjuring of a particular suspect profile. This is in large part due to how our system of criminal
justice brands criminality. Over-emphasizing Blackness at sentencing may result in the
offender’s race being placed on trial. Sentencing judges may feel the need to determine if the
offender’s particular brand of Blackness is causally linked to the offence. There are no
inexorable links between Blackness and crime, aside from those that are constructed through
anti-Blackness. Unfortunately, these links are not merely the product of racists, but may also
come from within the Black community. One ex-offender interviewee stated that “there is a link
between Blackness and crime, especially when it comes to drugs and guns.”399
397
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I found in my own experience that whenever police me, they always asked if I had a gun
or any drugs on me. The constant bombardment from the media, police, and community
members and even in our jurisprudence about the linkages between Blackness and violent
crimes, i.e. guns and drugs, serves to reinforce already entrenched notions about Black
criminality and dangerousness. It is against this backdrop that Black bodies are sentenced. Thus,
an overemphasizing of Blackness, albeit in an effort to attenuate these linkages, may actually
serve to amplify an already entrenched issue. Most of the ex-offenders expressed reluctance in
raising their race during sentencing because they believe that they should be judged based on
other factors, i.e. the offence. A majority of them stated that they only wanted to be treated as a
white offender. One ex-offender commented that “it should be what you did not your race that
should be considered.”400Another one explained that “if you commit a crime, then it should not
matter the race and culture of the person.”401It would appear that they desired a sentencing
regime that was race-neutral and colour-blind. One that focused less on their race, and more on
the offence. Their aspiration is puzzling given that in many cases, the offence is a result of antiBlack racism and other forms of structural violence.
Sentencing reform, however, is not a panacea for the problem of the over-criminalization
and mass incarceration of Black Canadians, and the broader problem of anti-Black racism.
Moreover, criminal sentencing is one point along a continuum of structurally violent
mechanisms targeting Black bodies. Indeed, the over-incarceration of Black Canadians is
systemic in scope and is supported and sustained through various institutions. Thus, criminal
sentencing may be a poor platform to address and remedy a social issue of this magnitude.

400

M.J. is a 38-year-old male Black ex-offender. This is a paraphrased from the orginal comment for clarity and
grammatical correctness.
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Moreover, the over-incarceration of Black bodies also relates to the general problem of antiBlack racism and the ways in which it infects the criminal justice system. Arguably, there is
some danger in seeking sentencing reform via IRCARS/CIARS, given that racism is an ordinary,
common and intractable feature of the criminal justice system.402Thus, sentencing reform may
not be considered a workable solution to the problem of the over-criminalization and overincarceration of Black bodies and the broader problem of anti-Black racism. There is a concern
that seeking change in such a hostile system is undesirable or, worse, impossible. This form of
nihilism is a tenet of the structural determinism thesis, which explains that “the idea that our
system, by reason of its structure and vocabulary, cannot redress certain types of wrong.”403
However, CRT scholars assert that innovation is key to law reform.404It is well
established that one of the primary causes of Black over-incarceration is the fact that Black
offenders often receive disproportionately higher criminal penalties compared to their similarlysituated white counterparts; and as such, one goal of progressive criminal justice reform should
be the promotion and facilitation of proportionate sentences for African Canadians.
IRCARs/CIARs are designed to highlight specific cultural, social, and political mitigating factors
that ought to be considered in the sentencing of African Canadian offenders, which raises the
following concern, namely: can CIARs/IRCARs be salutatory in the context of our current
sentencing regime? There is an activist dimension to the CIARs/IRCARS movement, insofar as
proponents seek to use them to transform the current sentencing regime. From a CRT perspective
this form of resistance is laudable. CRT scholars/activist “not only tries to understand our social
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situation but to change it: it sets out not only to ascertain how society organizes itself along racial
lines and hierarchies but to transform it for the better.” 405
In Morris, Justice Nakatsuru, while considering the role that leniency ought to play in the
sentencing of Black bodies explained the following:
[83]
But let me be real for a moment. The new charges does mean that
there are grounds to believe that your time while on bail on these charges have not gone
smoothly. Some may question why I am giving you leniency. For a 15-month sentence is
a lenient sentence. Some may argue that you are not worthy. That you have failings.
That you have not yet shown to have turned your life around.
[84]
In my opinion, we have to get past this idea of waiting for the perfect
person to be lenient. Waiting for the most benevolent soul by the standards of the
privileged and the few, before we decide to extend consideration for leniency. For we
may be waiting a long time. The young man who makes the choice to pick up a loaded
illegal handgun will not likely be a product of a private school upbringing who has the
security of falling back upon upper middle class family resources. Rather, he is likely to
be a product of oppression, despair, and disadvantage. Likely he is someone who cannot
turn his life around on a dime even if he wanted to. In short, he is you, Mr. Morris.
[85] So in the final analysis, what makes this sentencing different from other
cases where leniency was not given is that I have been given a wealth of information to
sentence you. Information that can be used to take further steps to deal with the overincarceration of Black people in this country.406

Justice Nakatsuru does not cite any precedent or authority for his analysis, except for the
information he received via the IRCAR and his own judicial notice of the plight faced by the
accused and members of his community. However, there is a concern that the Court of Appeal
may mistakenly construe IRCARs as a sophisticated (and expensive - not just in terms of money,
but the psychological burden placed on the offender and his/her community) plea for mercy and
not as a tool of mitigation within a proportionality-based sentencing regime. Mr. Morris is the
proverbial poster boy, which is supported by ample empirical sources for a significant subsection
of the Black community. As the court noted, Mr. Morris is the product of oppression, despair,
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and disadvantage. He embodies the unenviable qualities that beset a majority of the thousands of
Black men that are funnelled through the criminal justice system each year. Therefore, it is
questionable whether mercy, even as a countervailing concept, to correct a bona fide social
wrong, is what the Black community, whose collective backs IRCARs/CIARs sit atop, is a
worthwhile objective to pursue. In this context, mercy requires a plea to the conscience,
compassion and magnanimity of the presiding jurist. It seems to require a dereliction of his/her
judicial duty in advancement of racial justice.407 Mercy, however, may not simply be a plea to
the benevolence of sentencing judge.
Given that our system of criminal justice is skewed towards the over-punishment of
racialized offenders, some scholars have advocated for the introduction of mercy into criminal
sentencing as a means of correcting for this “punitive turn.”408CIARs/IRCARs are designed to
alert judges to mitigating factors that should properly inform a proportionate sentence, and is
thus consistent with a retributivist system. On this account, giving someone a lower sentence in
light of a CIAR/IRCAR is not merciful; the sentence is proportionate given the lower level of
blameworthiness evinced by the CIAR/IRCAR, and thus the sentence is appropriate from a
retributivist perspective. Alternatively, one could argue that a CIAR/IRCAR is designed to
407

As discussed above, I was once the recipient of white judicial compassion. I am not sure if my race or age played
a role in the judge’s decision, but one thing was clear – my life was in that judge’s hands. His decision prompted me
to begin to seriously consider the path that I was on. Did I deserve leniency? In my mind, I didn’t believe so. I
thought that I was too far gone. I had been warned plenty of times before by judges, Crowns, police officers, family
and friends to give up my lifestyle. However, none of them provided me with a suitable alternative. I was 23-yearold father of 4 children who had dropped out of high school and sold drugs to make a living. My life was eerily
similar to all of the offenders in the cases that I reviewed for this thesis, and the ex-offenders I interviuewed. All of
my friends and some of my male family members were involved in street-level criminality. Many had criminal
records, and some were deported or going through deportation proceedings. Even my older brother and two of our
friends were charged with 1st-degree murder. It was within this environment that I discovered a different notion of
Blackness. Like Messrs. Morris and Jackson, owning a gun was a requirement. Indeed, on two occasions when I was
arrested there was a gun in the car. Never on my person, however. So, whenever I appeared before a judge, I
expected the worse because my life was surrounded by disappointments. Therefore, the last person I expected to
seek salvation or compassion from was the person that embodied all the reasons that caused my situation.
408
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promote a more empathetic, holistic, merciful sentencing process that treats criminal sentencing
as a site for countering or counter-balancing anti-Black racism in society and the criminal justice
process. This latter claim might lead us to say: the proposed sentence is disproportionately low
but is justified by countervailing considerations. However, it is often argued that mercy is
incompatible with justice and thus has no place in criminal sentencing. For example, one may
perceive mercy as undesirable, given that it necessarily involves the performance of power
differentials, whereby an empowered individual chooses to extend a benefit to which the
disempowered individual has no right to claim, and is expected to receive in a spirit of gratitude.
This conceptualization of mercy seems to track with notions of degradation and serves as an
affront to human dignity. The following quote nicely summarizes the potential of deploying
mercy as a public value in Canadian sentencing law:
the place of mercy in Canadian penal justice is little developed in our jurisprudence.
There is a deep uncertainty whether mercy can be accommodated within the positive law
of sentencing or recognised only as an exceptional reason to depart from the ordinary
principles of the positive law that would apply in a given case. In a narrower form mercy
is apparent in some notions of mitigation for personal hardship. It may be seen also in
decisions that seek to redress deprivations that would be cruel or pointless. But, in a
broader sense, perhaps the most fertile ground for mercy is where the lawful power of
courts can be used to allow hope to flourish if there is a chance of success. If there is
such a chance, it may be argued that mercy provides a sufficient reason to depart from the
path that would otherwise be dictated by retributive objectives within the positive law of
sentencing.409

There is value in mercy, especially in situations where mercy tempers the mad fervour to punish
without due consideration for structural violence. Mercy does not track with degradation if it is
conceptualized as a bilateral grant; rather than the performance of power differentials.
IRCARs/CIARs can facilitate and promote a two-way flow of mercy wherein power relations are
flattened, and dignity is made a central consideration in sentencing determinations. The proposed
approach imagines a situation whereby the State seeks mercy from Black Canadians by
409
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providing quantitatively and qualitatively better sentences for Black offenders, and in turn, a
Black offender may feel morally emancipated when he or she makes a plea for mercy. Such an
approach can be considered as a shared grant of mercy. One in which both parties, the State and
Black offenders, seek and grant mercy. This approach is a dignity affirming compromise. It is
not about compensating for past wrongs; instead, it serves as the repatriation of stolen/lost
dignity.
Conclusion
In the end, IRCARs/CIARS may be a call for mercy, not as a sovereign grant, but as a
recognition of the cruelty that often ensues when mercy is eschewed. Perhaps the connotations
that generally travel with the concept of mercy is unfortunate. However, when conceptualized as
a mechanism that promotes hope and redresses social deprivations, one may argue that semantics
are insignificant. As Justice Nakatsuru aptly remarked: “in my opinion, we have to get past this
idea of waiting for the perfect person to be lenient. Waiting for the most benevolent soul by the
standards of the privileged and the few, before we decide to extend consideration for leniency.
For we may be waiting a long time.”410In a sense, CIARs/IRCARs invite sentencing judges to
take a chance on a Black offender and in so doing, infuse his or her life with hope. There is no
guarantee that the offender will not re-offend, but this is hardly a reason to deny them an
opportunity that was conspicuously absent in his or her life.
The judge in my sentencing hearing did not have the value of an IRCAR/CIAR, but as
with so many Black men, my Blackness was difficult to conceal. Any attempt at concealing or
erasing Blackness is futile. The fact that IRCARs/CIARs force judges and prosecutors to grapple
with these issues, despite the inherent pitfalls, is a laudable step in combatting anti-Black racism

410
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in criminal sentencing, and in the broader criminal justice system. Sentencing reform is at best,
only a partial solution to the structural violence endured by Black Canadians. There is, however,
a chance that by addressing anti-Blackness at a site where Black bodies are routinely degraded,
we may force a more honest confrontation of Black over-incarceration. Ultimately, the more
profound paradox of visibility may be this: in our society, there is a direct correlation between
the impossibility of looking past Blackness, and the unwillingness to look at anti-Blackness. If
looking more closely at Blackness makes it harder for the criminal justice system to look away
from anti-Black racism, then we will have achieved an incomplete but not insignificant victory.

113

Bibliography
Legislation
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
Youth Criminal Justice Act, SC 2002, c 1.
Jurisprudence
J.C. (Re), 2017 NSPC 14.
Peart v Peel Regional Police Services, [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 217 O.A.C. 269.
R v Biya, 2018 ONSC 6887.
R v Borde, 2003 CanLII 4187.
R v Boutilier, 2017 NSSC 308.
R v Brissett and Francis, 2018 ONSC 4957.
R v B.W.P.; R v B.V.N., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941, 2006 SCC 27.
R v D.B., 2015 NSPC 82.
R v Deng, 2017 BCPC 225.
R v Diabikulu, 2016 BCPC 390.
R v Downey, 2017 NSSC 302.
R v Duncan et al., 2012 CanLII 35904.
R v Elvira, 2018 ONSC 7008.
R v E. S., 2015 NSPC 81.
R v Ferguson, 2018 BCSC 1523.
R v Ferrigon, 2007 CanLII 16828 (ON SC).
R v Find, 2001 SCC 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 863.
114

R v Gabriel, 2017 NSSC 90.
R v G.B., [2003] O.J. No. 3218.
R v Gerald Desmond 2018 NSSC 338.
R v Golden 2001 SCC 83.
R v Grant 2009 SCC 32.
R v Hailemolokot et al., 2013 MBQB 285).
R v Hamilton, 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA).
R v Ipeelee [2012] 1 SCR 433, 2012 SCC 13.
R v Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527.
R v Kabanga-Muanza, 2019 ONSC 1161 (CanLII).
R v Le 2019 SCC 34.
R v M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 SCR 500, 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC).
R v Morris, 2018 ONSC 5186.
R v N.W., 2018 NSPC 14.
R v Ngeruka, 2015 YKTC 22.
R v Nimaga, 2018 ONCJ 795.
R v Parks, [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353.
R v Perry, 2019 NSSC 92.
R v Perry, 2018 NSSC 16.
R v R.D., 2015 NSPC 83.
R v Reid, 2016 ONSC 8210.
R v Riley, 2019 NSSC 92.
R v Shallow, 2019 ONSC 403 (CanLII).
115

R v Spence 2005 SCC 71.
R v Spencer, 2004 CanLII 5550 (ON CA).
R v Sutherland, 2016 ONCA 674, 342 C.C.C. (3d) 309.
R v T.J.T., 2018 ONSC 5280.
R v Wells, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207.
R v Williams, 2018 ONSC 5409.
R v Williams [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49.
R v “X”, 2014 NSPC 95.
R v Zaher, 2017 ONSC 582 (CanLII) aff’d R v Zaher, 2019 ONCA 59 (CanLII).
Secondary Sources and Government Reports
Abiodun Balogun, Oladele, “A Philosophical Defence of Punishment in Traditional African
Legal Culture: The Yoruba Example” (2009) 3:3 The Journal of Pan African Studies 43.
A Collective Impact: Interim Report on the inquiry into racial profiling and racial discrimination
of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission,
2018)
Agamben, Giorgio, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
Alexander, Michelle, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
(New York: The New Press, 2012).
Anderson, Joan M., “Toward a Post-Colonial Feminist Methodology in Nursing Research:
Exploring the Convergence of Post-Colonial and Black Feminist Scholarship” (2002) 9 (3) Nurse
Researcher 7.
Anleu, Sharyn Roach, Brewer, Russell & Mack, Kathy, “Locating the Judge within Sentencing
Research” (2017) 6:2 International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 46.
Avraham, Ronen & Statman, Daniel, “More on the Comparative Nature of Desert: Can a
Deserved Punishment Be Unjust?” (2013) 25:3 Utilitas 316.
Aylward, Carol A., “Intersectionality: Crossing the Theoretical and Praxis Divide” (2010) 1:1
Journal of Critical Race Inquiry 1.
Backhouse, Constance, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada, 1900--1950
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History,
1999).
116

Bagaric, Mirko, “Proportionality in Sentencing: Its Justification, Meaning and Role” (2000)12:2
Current Issues Crim. Just. 143.
Bahn, Susanne & Weatherill, Pamela, “Qualitative social research: a risky business when it
comes to collecting ‘sensitive’ data” (2012) 13:1 Qualitative Research 19.
Bibas, Stephanos, "Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure" (2007) 4:2 Ohio State J of Crim L 329.
Bibas, Stephanos, The Machinery of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012)
Binder, Guyora, “Punishment Theory: Moral or Political” (2002) 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 321.
Bradley, Gerard V., “Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment” (2003/2004) 27:1 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 19.
Brett, Nathan, “Mercy and Criminal Justice: A Plea for Mercy” (1992) 5:1 Can JL & Jur 81.
Bryant, Alan W., Michelle Fuerst & Sidney N. Lederman, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 5th
ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2018).
Burgh, Richard W., “Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?” (1982) 79:4 The Journal of
Philosophy 193.
Butler, Paul, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice (New York: The New Press, 2010)
Butler, Paul, “Racially based jury nullification: black power in the criminal justice system”
(1995) 105:3 Yale L.J. 677.
Cacho, Lisa Marie, Social death: Racialized Rightlessness and the Criminalization of the
Unprotected (New York University Press, 2012)
Calathes, William, “Racial capitalism and punishment philosophy and practices: what really
stands in the way of prison abolition” (2017) 20:4 Contemporary Justice Review 442.
Cavadino,Michael “Penology” in Eugene McLaughlin & Tim Newburn, SAGE Handbook of
Criminological Theory, ed, (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2010) 447.
Cooper, Afua, “Acts of resistance: Black men and women engage slavery in Upper Canada,
1793-1803” (2007) 99:1 Ontario History.
Cottreau-Robins, Catherine M.A., “Searching for the Enslaved in Nova Scotia’s Loyalist
Landscape” 2014) 43:1 Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region 125.
Crenshaw, Kimberle, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U of
Chicago Leg Forum 139.
Crichlow, Wesley, “Weaponization and Prisonization of Toronto’s Black Male Youth” (2014) 8
Caribbean review of gender studies 235.
117

Delgado, Richard & Stefancic, Jean, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: NYU
Press 2001).
DeVault, Marjorie L., “Talking Back to Sociology: Distinctive Contributions of Feminist
Methodology” (1996) 22:1 Annual Review of Sociology 29.
Devlin, Richard F., & Matthew Sherrard, “The Big Chill?: Contextual Judgment after R. v.
Hamilton and Mason” (2005) 28 Dalhousie L.J. 409.
Dioso, Rachel, & Doob, Anthony N, “An Analysis of Public Support for Special Consideration
of Aboriginal Offenders at Sentencing” (2001) 43:3 Can J Corr 405.
Dolinko, David, "Some Naive Thoughts about Justice and Mercy" (2007) 4:2 Ohio State J of
Crim L 349.
Donelson, Raff, “Blacks, Cops, and the State of Nature” (2017) 15:1 Ohio State J of Crim L 183.
Donovan, Ken, “Female Slaves as Sexual Victims in Île Royale,” (2014) 43:1 Acadiensis:
Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region 147.
Donovan, Kenneth, “Slaves and Their Owners in Ile Royale, 1713-1760” (1995) 25:1
Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the Atlantic Region 3.
Doob, Anthony N. Webster, Cheryl Marie, et al., “Issues related to Harsh Sentences and
Mandatory Minimum Sentences: General Deterrence and Incapacitation” (2014) Criminological
Highlights < https://criminology.utoronto.ca/criminological-highlights/>
Doob, Anthony N. & Webster, Cheryl Marie, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null
Hypothesis” (2003) 30 Crime & Just. 143.
Douyon, Emerson, “Ethnocultural Minorities and the Canadian Correctional System” (2016)
Correctional Service Canada < https://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/about-us/006-4000-eng.shtml>
Duff, R.A., “Desert and Penance” in A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, ed., Principled Sentencing:
Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998).
Duff, R A, "The Intrusion of Mercy" (2007) 4:2 Ohio State J of Crim L 361.
Duff, R.A., Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Exum, Jelani Jefferson, “Purpose-Focused Sentencing: How Reforming Punishment Can
Transform Policing” (2016) 29:1 Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 1.
Farley, Anthony P., “The Black Body as Fetish Object” (1997) 76: 3 Oregon Law Review 457.
Ferguson, Gerry, “A Review of the Principles and Purposes of Sentencing in Sections 718718.21 of the Criminal Code” (2016) Research and Statistics Division Department of Justice
Canada <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/rppss-eodpa/RSD_2016-eng.pdf>
118

Feminism, Law, Inclusion. Intersectionality in Action, ed by Gayle Macdonald, Rachel L.
Osborne and Charles C. Smith (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2005).
Focquaert, Farah, Glenn, Andrea & Raine, Adrian “Free Will, Responsibility, and the
Punishment of Criminals” in Thomas A. Nadelhoffer, The Future of Punishment (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
Foster, Sheila R., “Critical Race Lawyering: Foreword” (2005) 73:5 Fordham L. Rev. 2027.
Fox, Richard G., “The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing” (1994) 19(3) Melbourne U L
Rev 489.
Fox, Richard G., “When Justice Sheds a Tear: The Place of Mercy in Sentencing” (1999) 25:1
Monash U L Rev 1.
Friedland, Hadley Louise, The Wetiko Legal Principles: Cree and Anishinabek Responses to
Violence and Victimization (University of Toronto Press, 2018).
From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice: Discussion Paper (Ottawa - Ontario: Law
Commission of Canada 1999).
Ghorashi, Halleh, “When the Boundaries are Blurred: The Signiﬁcance of Feminist Methods in
Research” (2005) 12:3 European Journal of Women’s 363.
Goffman, Alice, On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City (New York: Picador, 2015)
Gómez, Laura E., “Looking for Race in All the Wrong Places” (2012) 46:2 Law and Society
Review 221.
Gomez, Palcido G, “The Dilemma of Difference: Race as a Sentencing Factor” (1994) 24:2
Golden Gate UL Rev 357.
Greenawalt, Kent, “Commentary: Punishment” (1983) 74:2 The Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology 343.
Hannah-Moffat, Kelly and Maurutto, Paula, “Re-contextualizing pre-sentence reports: Risk and
race” (2010) 12:3 Punishment & Society 262.
Hart, Samuel L., “Axiology--Theory of Values” (1971) 32:1 Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 29.
Hayden, L.C. & Bulow, P.H., “Who’s Talking? Drawing Focus Groups—Some Methodological
Considerations” (2003) 6:4 International Journal of Social Research Methodology 305.
Henderson, Veronica, “The School Bus to Wilkie and the Walk to Colonus: Latimer, Antigone
and the Role for Mercy in Sentencing,” (2002) 14 Windsor Rev of Legal and Social Issues 33.
Hrabovsky, Milan, “The Concept of “BLACKNESS” in Theories of Race” (2013) 22:1 Asian
and African Studies 65.
119

Hudson, Barbara A., “Mitigation for socially deprived Offenders” in A. Von Hirsch and A.
Ashworth, ed., Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart
Publishing 1998) 205.
Hunter, Margaret, “Rethinking Epistemology, Methodology and Racism: Or, Is White Sociology
Really Dead?” (2002) 5: 2 Race and Society 119.
Hurd, Heidi M, "The Morality of Mercy" (2007) 4:2 Ohio State J of Crim L 389.
Irvine Paul Drew, Annie, .et.al, “ ‘Am I not answering your questions properly?’ Clarification,
adequacy and responsiveness in semi-structured telephone and face-to-face interviews” (2012)
13:1 Qualitative Research 87
Ives, Dale E., “Inequality, Crime and Sentencing: Borde, Hamilton and the Relevance of Social
Disadvantage in Canadian Sentencing Law” (2004) 30 Queen's L.J. 114.
Jai, Julie & Cheng, Joseph, “The Invisibility of Race in Section 15: Why Section 15 of the
Charter Has Not Done More to Promote Racial Equality” (2006) 5 J.L. & Equality 125.
James, Carl, & Turner, Tana, Towards Race Equity in Education: The Schooling of Black
Students in the Greater Toronto Area (Toronto, Ontario, Canada: York University 2017).
Johnson Jr, Alex M, “Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color:
Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship” (1994) 79 Iowa L. Rev. 803.
Kaiser, H. Archibald, "Borde and Hamilton: Facing the Uncomfortable Truth About Inequality,
Discrimination and General Deterrence" (2003) 8 C.R. (6th) 289.
Khenti, Akwatu, “The Canadian war on drugs: Structural violence an unequal treatment of Black
Canadians” (2014) 25 International Journal of Drug Policy 190.
Kuwee Kumsa, Martha, Mfoafo-M'Carthy, Magnus, Oba, Funke & Gaasim, Sadia, “The
Contours of Anti-Black Racism: Engaging Anti-Oppression from Embodied Spaces” (2014) 1:1
The Journal of Critical Anti-Oppressive Social Inquiry 21.
Lawrence N, Sonia & Williams, Toni, “Swallowed Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of
Canadian Sentencing” (2006) 56:4 UTLJ 285.
Llewellyn, Jennifer J., Restorative Justice in Borde and Hamilton — A Systemic Problem?
(2003) 8 C.R. (6th) 308.
Llewellyn, Jennifer and Howse, Robert, “Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework” (1999).
Prepared for the Law Commission of Canada, 1999. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2114291
Lumsden, Karen, “ ‘You Are What You Research’: Researcher Partisanship and the Sociology of
the ‘Underdog’ ” (2012) 13:1 Qualitative Research 3.
120

Mackey, Frank, Done with slavery: the Black fact in Montreal, 1760-1840, (McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2010).
Maeder, Evelyn M. & Susan Yamamoto, “Investigating Race Salience, Defendant Race, and
Victim Race Effects on Mock Juror Decision-Making in Canada” (2019) 36:5 Justice Quarterly
929.
Malakieh, Jamil, “Adult and youth correctional statistics in Canada 2016/2017” (2018) Canadian
Centre for Justice Statistics, < https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/85-002x/2018001/article/54972-eng.pdf?st=LI8Q630j>
Mallett, Christopher, “The School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Critical Review of the Punitive
Paradigm Shift” (2016) 33:1 Child & Adolescent Social Work Journal 15-24.
Maynard, Robyn, Policing Black Lives State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present
(Black Point, NS: Fernwood Publishing 2017).
Mims, Sekou, Higginbottom, Larry & Reid, Omar, “Behaviour Definition for Post Trauma and
the African Experience: Post Traumatic Slavery Disorder” (2001) Pyramid Builders, Inc./Osiris
Group <http://osirisinstitute.com>
Morgan, Kenneth, A short history of Transatlantic Slavery (London: I.B. Tauris &CO. Ltd,
2016).
Morley, Gareth, “A Just Measure of Pain - Sentencing and Sentencing Reform in the Era of the
Charter” (1997) 55 U.Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 269.
Morris, Herbert, “A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment” (1981) 18:4 American Philosophical
Quarterly 263.
Mosher, Clayton, “The reaction to Black Violent Offenders in Ontario -1892-1961: A Test of the
Threat Hypothesis” (1999) 14:4 Sociological Forum 635.
“Motion commemorating 200th anniversary of the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act, 1807 March
21, 2007.” Ontario History, vol. 99, no. 1, 2007, p. IV. Gale Academic OneFile Select,
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A166272061/EAIM?u=yorku_main&sid=EAIM&xid=f2e36
7e7. Accessed 10 Aug. 2019.
Muller, Eric L., “The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing” (1993) 24:1 Seton Hall L Rev
288.
Munster, Rens V., “The War on Terrorism: When The Exception Becomes The Rule” (2004) 17
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 142.
Murdocca, Carmela, “National Responsibility and Systemic Racism in Criminal Sentencing: The
Case of R. v. Hamilton” in Nicholas Blomley and Sean Robertson, eds. The Place of Justice
(Vancouver: Fernwood Publishing, 2006) 67.
121

Murdocca, Carmela, To right historical wrongs: race, gender, and sentencing in Canada (UBC
Press, 2013).
Mutua, Athena D., “The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and
Related Scholarship” (2006) 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 329.
Nicholls, Ruth, “Research and Indigenous participation: critical reflexive methods” (2009) 12:2
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 117.
Oliver, William, “Cultural Racism and Structural Violence: Implications for African
Americans” (2001) 4:2/3, Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 1.
One Vision One Voice: Changing the Ontario Child Welfare System to Better Serve African
Canadians (Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies, 2016) <http://www.oacas.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/One-Vision-One-Voice-Part-1_digital_english.pdf>
Owusu-Bempah, Akwasi, “Race and policing in historical context: Dehumanization and the
policing of Black people in the 21st century” (2017) Theoretical Crimin. 21:1 23.
Owusu-Bempah, Akwasi, “Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Canada” in Sandra M. Bucerius
and Michael Tonry, The Oxford handbook of ethnicity, crime, and immigration (Oxford: Oxford
Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial Profiling (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights
Commission, 2003)
Penney, Steve, et al, Criminal Procedure in Canda, (Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2011).
Plankey-Videla, Nancy, “Informed Consent as Process: Problematizing Informed Consent in
Organizational Ethnographies” (2012) 35:1 Qualitative Sociology 1.
Plaxton, Michael, “Nagging Doubts About the Use of Race (and Racism) in Sentencing” (2003)
8 C.R. (6th) 299.
Policy and guidelines on racism and racial discrimination (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights
Commission, 2005 and revised in 2009).
Quigley, Tim, "Brief Investigatory Detentions: A Critique of R. v. Simpson" (2004) 41:4 Alta L
Rev 935.
Rapley, Timothy J.,“The Art(fullness) of Open-Ended Interviewing: Some Considerations on
Analysing Interviews” (2001) 1:3 Qualitative Research 303.
Razack Sherene, Casting out: the eviction of Muslims from western law and politics (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008).
Razack, Sherene, Looking white people in the eye: gender, race, and culture in courtrooms and
classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

122

Reasons, Charles, Hassan, Shereen, Ma, Michael, et.al, “Race and Criminal Justice in Canada”
(2016) 11:2 International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 76.
Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto:
Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995)
Report of the Independent Street Checks Review (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2018)
Riddell, William Renwick, Slave in Canada (Washington: Association for the Study of Negro
Life and History, 1920).
Roach, Kent, "Making Progress on Understanding and Remedying Racial Profiling" (2004) 41:4
Alta L Rev 895.
Roberts, Julian V & Doob, Anthony N, “Race, Ethnicity, and Criminal Justice in Canada” (1997)
21 Crime & Justice: A Rev of Research 469.
Ross E Lee, “A Vision of Race, Crime and Justice Through the Lens of Critical Race Theory” in
Eugene McLaughlin & Tim Newburn, SAGE Handbook of Criminological Theory, ed, (SAGE
Publications Ltd, 2010) 391.
Rudin, Jonathan, “Aboriginal Over-representation and R. v. Gladue: Where We Were, Where
We Are and Where We Might Be Going” (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 687.
Rudin, Jonathan and Roach, Kent, “Broken Promises: A Response to Stenning and Roberts'
"Empty Promises"” (2002) 65 Sask. L. Rev. 3.
Rudin, Jonathan, “Eyes Wide Shut: The Alberta Court of Appeal’s Decision in R. v. Arcand and
Aboriginal Offenders” (2011) 48:4 Alberta Law Review 987.
Rudin, Jonathan, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Criminal Justice System” (2018)
https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/ipperwash/policy_part/research/pdf/Rudin.p
df
Scheuerman, William E., “Emergency powers” (2006) 2:1 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 257.
Senthe, Shanthi E. & Xavier, Sujith, “Re-igniting Critical Race in Canadian Legal Spaces:
Introduction to the Special Symposium Issue of Contemporary Accounts of Racialization in
Canada” (2013) 31:2 Windsor Y B Access Just. University Press, 2014).
Shelby, Tommie, “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto” (2007) 35:2 Philosophy & Public
Affairs 126. Sheehy, Elizabeth, “Equality and Supreme Court Criminal Jurisprudence: Never the
Twain Shall Meet” (2010) 50 SCLR (2d) 329 at 29.
Sibblis, Camisha, “Expulsion Programs as Colonizing Spaces of Exception” (2014) 21:1 Race,
Gender & Class 64.
Singh, Anne-Marie & Sprott, Jane B, “Race Matters: Public Views on Sentencing” (2017) 59:3
Can J of Crimin and Crim Justice 285.
123

Song, Daniel J. & Boyle, Christine, “When Race Matters in Sentencing: R. v. Ramsay and R. v.
Hamilton, 22 C.R. (6th) 86.
Steiker, Carol, “The Mercy Seat: Discretion, Justice, and Mercy in the American Criminal
Justice System” in Michael Klarman, David Skeel, & Carol Steiker, The Political Heart of
Criminal Procedure: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
Stenning, Philip and Roberts, Julian V., “Empty Promises: Parliament, The Supreme Court, and
the Sentencing of Aboriginal Offenders” (2001) 64 Sask. L. Rev. 137.
Stuart, Don, “Charter Standards for Investigative Powers: Have the Courts Got the Balance
Right?” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 3.
Sudbury, Julia, “Celling black bodies: black women in the global prison industrial complex”
(2002) 70 feminist review 57.
Sylvestre, Marie-Eve, “Moving Towards a Minimalist and Transformative Criminal Justice
System: Essay on the Reform of the Objectives and Principles of Sentencing” (2016) Research
and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rppr/jr/pps-opdp/pps-opdp.pdf >
Tanovich, David M., “Using the Charter to Stop Racial Profiling: The Development of an
Equality-Based Conception of Arbitrary Detention” (2002) 40:2 Osgoode Hall L J 145.
Tanovich, David M., “E-Racing Racial Profiling” (2004) 41:4 Alberta L Rev 905.
Tanovich, David, “Race, Sentencing and the "War on Drugs” (2004) 22 C.R. (6th) 45.
Tanovich, David M., “The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada” (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2006).
Tanovich, David M., “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38 C.R. (6th) 84.
Tanovich, David M., “Constitutional Cases 2007 Ignoring the Golden Principle of Charter
Interpretation?”(2008), 42 SCLR (2d) 441.
Tanovich, David M., “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial
Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 655.
Tanovich, David M., “Applying the Racial Profiling Correspondence Test” in Lorne Foster,
Lesley Jacobs, Bobby Sui & Shaheen Azmi, Racial Profiling and Human Rights in Canada: The
New Legal Landscape (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018) 83.
Taslitz, Andrew E., "Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent" (2006) 4:1
Ohio State J of Crim L 121.
124

TEDx,Talks “Anthony Peterson - What I am learning from my white grandchildren: Truths about
Race” (4 November 2014), online
(video): YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5GCetbP7Fg >
Thorburn, Malcolm, “Accountability and Proportionality in Youth Criminal Justice” (2009) 55:3
Crim LQ 304.
Trevethan, Shelley and Rastin, Christopher J., “A Profile of Visible Minority Offenders in the
Federal Canadian Correctional System”(2004) Research Branch Correctional Service of Canada
<http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/r144-eng.shtml#LinkTarget_24738>
Tyler, Tom R., “Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law” (2003) 30 Crime
& Just. 283.
Von Hirsch, Andrew, “Proportionate sentences: A Desert Perspective” in A. von Hirsch and A.
Ashworth, ed., Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart
Publishing 1998).
Von Hirsch, Andrew, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From "Why Punish?" to
"How Much?” (1990) 1:2 Criminal Law Forum 259.
Von Hirsch, Andrew, “Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment” (1992)16 Crime & Just.
55. Walker, Nigel, “Desert: Some Doubts” in A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, ed., Principled
Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998).
Walker, Barrington, Race on Trial: Black Defendants in Ontario’s Criminal Courts, 1858-1958
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History,
2010).
Walker, Nigel, “Desert: Some Doubts” in A. von Hirsch and A. Ashworth, ed., Principled
Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing 1998).
Walshaw, Margaret, “The Concept of Identity Positioning the Self within Research”
<https://www.mathunion.org/fileadmin/ICMI/files/About_ICMI/Publications_about_ICMI/ICM
E_11/Walshaw.pdf>
Walshaw, Margaret, “The Researcher’s Self in Research: Confronting Issues about Knowing and
Understanding Others” < https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED520979.pdf>
Warren, Calvin L., Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation (Duke University
Press, 2018)
Warren, Carol A. B., Tori Barnes-Brus, Heather Burgess et al., “After the Interview” (2003) 26:1
Qualitative Sociology 93.
Warren, Carol & Williams, Kristine, “Interviewing Elderly Residents in Assisted Living” (2008)
31:4 Qualitative Sociology 407.
125

Watson, Irene, Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law: Raw Law (Routledge,
2015).
Weinrib, Lloyd L., “Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility” (1986) 49:3 Law and
Contemporary Problems 47.
Whitman, Q James, Harsh justice: criminal punishment and the widening divide between
America and Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Williams, Toni, “Sentencing Black Offenders in the Ontario Criminal Justice System,” in Julian
V Roberts and David P Cole, “Making sense of sentencing” (University of Toronto Press, 1999)
200.
Wortley, Scot, & Tanner, Julian, “Data, Denials, and Confusion: The Racial Profiling Debate in
Toronto” (2003) 45 Can. J. of Crimin. & Crim. Jus. 367.
Wortley, Scot, “A Double-Edged Sword: Carding, Public Safety, and the Impact of Racialized
Police Practices” in Lorne Foster, Lesley Jacobs, Bobby Sui & Shaheen Azmi, Racial Profiling
and Human Rights in Canada: The New Legal Landscape (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018) 257.

126

Appendices

Appendix A: Sample Questions for Defence Lawyer Participants
1. What do you consider to be the purpose(s) and/or objective(s) of sentencing?
2. Are you usually satisfied that the sentence received is reasonable? If so, why? If not,
why not?
3. Are you concerned at times that factors such as race may affect the sentence given? If
so, why do you think so?
4. Have you experienced what you would describe as unfair or unreasonable sentencing
when representing non-white clients? Can you elaborate by way of specific case
experiences?
5. Do you think that there is a relationship between race and crime? If so, can you explain
why?
6. In your view, should consideration(s) be given to an offender’s race when he/she is
being sentenced? If so, why or why not? Explain what factors/issues should be taken
into account for sentencing?
7. Do you think that the historical and general mistreatment of African-Canadians affects
the outcome when an individual member of that group is being sentenced for a crime
he/she committed?
8. Some argue that, in general, Aboriginal and Black offenders have been overincarcerated? Do you have any thoughts on the over-incarceration of Aboriginal and
Black offenders?
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Appendix B: Sample Questions for non-Lawyer Participants
1. Are you concerned at times that factors such as race may affect the sentence given?
If so, why do you think so?
2. In your view, should consideration(s) be given to an offender’s race when he/she is being
sentenced? If so, why or why not? Explain what factors/issues should be taken into account
for sentencing?
3. Do you think that there is a relationship between race and crime? If so, can you explain
why?
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